

Activation of Ethnic Tensions: Resettlement, Diversity, and Conflict in the Long Run*

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Abstract

This paper studies how communities made diverse by historical migration become vulnerable to conflict when latent intergroup cleavages are activated. During 1984-86, Ethiopia forcibly resettled more than 600,000 people in an emergency program, increasing ethnic diversity across districts. In 2015, unrelated protests over Addis Ababa's expansion plan catalyzed a nationwide rise in ethnic salience. Using a difference-in-differences design, I show that historically resettled districts, which had remained peaceful for years, experienced more militia-perpetrated violence targeting civilians when ethnicity became salient. Heightened ethnic salience increased in-group identification and eroded interethnic trust. The effects were especially large in resettlement destinations with greater polarization, initial integration difficulties, and ethnic wealth disparities, where the national shock to ethnic salience reactivated latent divisions and grievances.

Keywords: Migration, Resettlement, Diversity, Conflict, Salience, Ethnic Divisions

JEL Codes: D63, D74, J15, J18, O15, R23

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1 Introduction

Why do some ethnically diverse communities that have long remained peaceful suddenly descend into violence? Over the past decade, conflict, climate shocks, and state-led interventions have driven large-scale internal migration, increasing ethnic cohabitation. Understanding how demographic shifts shape social relations, particularly when differences become salient, is critical for anticipating conflict. While we know broadly about the effects of diversity on conflict in the cross-section, there is limited evidence on how the activation of ethnic identities modulates the effect of diversity on conflict in the long-run.


Conflict is not an inevitable consequence of diversity even when intergroup cleavages become salient. Indeed, the literature on diversity and conflict finds mixed evidence on their relationship (Kanbur et al., 2011). Greater diversity increases exposure to wider perspectives and strengthens shared identity (Allport, 1954; Abel, 2019; Bazzi et al., 2019; Carlitz et al., 2024), which can help diverse communities withstand rising forces of division. However, diverse communities are also vulnerable to manipulation of grievances by elites (Fearon and Laitin, 2000) and competitions over power and resources (Esteban and Ray, 2011), which can fuel conflict during heightened ethnic tensions. Furthermore, the strength of ethnic identification is shaped by the social landscape and historical context (Green, 2022). In this paper, I study how ethnic cohabitation induced by forced resettlement in Ethiopia affects conflict when intergroup divisions became salient due to nationwide protests unrelated to the historical resettlement.

In response to the 1984 famine, Ethiopia relocated over 600,000 people from the densely populated, drought-prone highlands to sparsely settled lowlands. The resettlement was implemented hastily, disregarding the rights of the resettled and host communities. It dispossessed indigenous communities that had depended on the reallocated land under customary tenure, while increasing ethnic diversity and creating minority enclaves across destination areas. Decades later, protests against the expansion of Addis Ababa into the Oromia region ignited a nationwide surge in ethnic salience and group-based mobilization, generating a widespread shock to interethnic relations. The historical variation in resettlement, combined with the recent and unrelated rise in ethnic tensions, offers a unique setting to study how diversity shapes conflict when differences become salient.

As Figure 1 shows, resettlement and non-resettlement districts, which substantially differed in their diversity, had similarly low levels of conflicts targeting civilians for several years after the resettlement. However, following the nationwide surge in ethnic tensions in 2015, there is a significant rise in incidence of conflict, particularly in resettlement districts. This paper studies how the activation of ethnic identities by external forces can

undo years of relatively peaceful coexistence in communities with substantial ethnic diversity and unresolved grievances.

Figure 1: Violence Targeting Civilians By Resettlement Status



Source: Conflict data is from ACLED ([Raleigh et al., 2010](#)), and resettlement status is based on the *Report on census of population and housing and on survey of demographic changes in the resettlement areas* ([CSO, 1991](#))

I employ a difference-in-differences design that leverages the variation in historical resettlement intensity across districts and recent nationwide rise in ethnic salience to examine how resettlement affects conflict when interethnic differences become salient. The main outcomes are incidences and fatalities from conflicts targeting civilians constructed using ACLED ([Raleigh et al., 2010](#)). The baseline specification includes district and province-by-year fixed effects to account for time-invariant district characteristics and flexibly allow for differential trends in conflict across provinces. In addition, I include the interactions between a set of baseline correlates of resettlement intensity with post 2015 indicator to account for the potentially confounding effects of these factors. I also use an event-study specification to assess pre-trends and examine the dynamic response of conflict to the nationwide rise in ethnic salience by resettlement intensity.

I find that high-resettlement districts experience substantial increases in conflict during periods of heightened ethnic salience. These districts experience more frequent and more severe violence targeting civilians, mainly perpetrated by ethnic militias. Amhara civilians, who accounted for 64% of the initial settlers, are more likely to be targeted in

these conflicts. The event-study estimates show no differential pre-trends in conflict between high- and low-resettlement districts before the 2015 rise in ethnic salience. After 2015, however, high-resettlement districts experience significantly more frequent and deadlier violence targeting civilians. The nationwide rise in ethnic salience reactivated ethnic divisions in resettlement districts, which are uniquely vulnerable because of their demographic composition, ethnic wealth disparities, and traumatic history.

Decades later, resettlement districts are more ethnically diverse and host a larger share of non-indigenous residents. The resettlement also increased ethnic segregation by concentrating settlers in minority enclaves. Despite this increase in diversity, resettlement districts do not experience higher conflict for decades. After the nationwide rise in ethnic salience, however, destination districts with greater diversity experience a significant increase in conflict. Individuals in these districts are more likely to identify with their ethnicity and less likely to trust their neighbors. The increase in ethnic identification is larger among indigenous residents, whereas the decline in trust in neighbors is stronger among non-indigenous residents. These patterns are consistent with the observed increase in violence by ethnic militias targeting non-indigenous civilians.

Furthermore, part of the increase in conflict is driven by greater ethnic wealth stratification in resettlement destinations. In high-resettlement areas, a larger share of inequality in wealth and landholding lies between ethnic groups rather than within them. These disparities may stem from the program's land reallocation and higher early investments in infrastructure and public services in the newly formed resettlement villages. [Alesina et al. \(2016\)](#) show that larger between ethnic group inequality is associated with underdevelopment and heightened perception of discrimination. Consistent with this, I find that conflict is higher in resettlement areas with larger ethnic wealth disparities, where divisions may be more easily mobilized to fuel violence when ethnic tensions rise.

The implementation of the resettlement also shapes its long-run effects on conflict. Destinations that faced early social integration difficulties, particularly communal violence, experience more conflict when ethnic cleavages become salient, consistent with the reactivation of older tensions after 2015. By contrast, districts with a larger share of integrated resettlements, where settlers are embedded in indigenous communities rather than segregated in enclaves, exhibit less ethnic division and fewer conflicts targeting civilians. Overall, the findings indicate that resettlement destinations, especially those marked by grievances or segregation rooted in the program's implementation, are more vulnerable to civilian-targeting violence during periods of heightened ethnic tension.

I conduct several checks to test the robustness of key findings. The results are robust to considering alternative treatment definitions, using domestic Google search-based

measures of ethnic salience, different sample restrictions, alternative specifications that account for an extensive list of potential confounders, and alternative measures of conflict outcomes. While the estimates vary slightly across these specifications, I consistently find significant increases in conflict in high-resettlement districts following the rise in ethnic salience nationwide. The main results are also robust to accounting for the changes in state capacity and mobile connectivity that coincided with the rise in ethnic salience.

This paper contributes to the literature on how historical legacies and identities can be reactivated by external shocks to shape contemporary outcomes. Recent studies show that collective memories of past trauma, such as Ottoman pillaging in Austria, Nazi reprisals in Greece, or chaotic transition in Russia, can be mobilized during moments of political or economic tension to generate backlash against out-groups or entrench political support (Ochsner and Roesel, 2024; Fouka and Voth, 2023; Belmonte and Rochlitz, 2019). Elites can also exploit group-based grievances to consolidate power, and increased minority salience can polarize the majority group's political behavior (Colussi et al., 2021). Political and economic shocks can also interact to trigger ethnic conflict (Grosfeld et al., 2020). This paper shows that the surge in ethnic salience in Ethiopia, ignited by protests unrelated to the historical resettlement, reactivated ethnic identities and fueled violence. The findings underscore how historical grievances, such as those seeded by a forced resettlement that disregarded host and settler rights, can be reignited to produce new cycles of conflict.

This paper also speaks to the literature on the long-run effects of forced cohabitation by leveraging a unique natural experiment.¹ While there are rigorous tests of contact theory at the individual level, often using lab and field experiments (Elwert et al., 2023; Freddi et al., 2024; Lowe, 2021), there is limited evidence on the long-run effects of policy-induced intergroup contact and moderating factors at the community level (Lowe, 2025). Dippel (2014) find that forced integration of historically autonomous sub-tribal bands in 19th century US hampered economic development. However, Jha (2013) show that interethnic complementarities in diverse communities can foster ethnic tolerance and development. Abel (2019) finds that diverse resettlements in South Africa had greater social capital due to increased interethnic interactions. I find that the increased ethnic diversity induced by the forced resettlement contributes to greater conflict. However, districts with initially more integrated settlements experience less conflict even during periods of heightened ethnic salience. The consequences of interethnic contact hinge on the salience of underlying cleavages and the manner in which groups are brought together.

In its effort to study how resettlement-induced diversity affects conflict, this paper

¹Becker and Ferrara (2019) present an extensive review of the literature which documents how episodes of forced migration can pose various challenges for migrants and receiving populations.

also contributes to the literature on ethnic diversity and nation building. [Bazzi et al. \(2019\)](#) study the effects of a planned resettlement in Indonesia and find that increased ethnic fractionalization fostered greater integration while polarization exacerbated ethnic attachment. Similarly, [Carlitz et al. \(2024\)](#) find that a resettlement in Tanzania (*Ujamaa*), bolstered national identity among the cohorts that were young enough to be exposed. In this paper, I find that the ethnic diversity induced by the resettlement, particularly polarization, resulted in greater ethnic strife during period of heightened ethnic salience.

Three key factors may explain the differences in the findings of this paper compared to [Bazzi et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Carlitz et al. \(2024\)](#). First, this paper studies the effects of resettlement induced diversity on conflict when ethnic divisions become salient. Second, unlike in [Bazzi et al. \(2019\)](#), the Ethiopian resettlement moved people of different ethnicities to areas already populated by indigenous groups that were aggrieved by the land dispossession. Finally, unlike *Ujamaa*, which included measures to bolster national identity, the Ethiopian resettlement was driven by agro-economic objectives without a concerted effort to integrate settler and host communities. Overall, the findings in this study show that forced cohabitation without the requisite efforts to integrate the new communities and address historical grievances can have detrimental consequences in the long-run.

This paper is also related to the literature on the roots of civil conflicts. A rich literature within economics and political science highlights the economic origins of civil conflicts ([McGuirk and Burke, 2020](#); [Berman and Couttenier, 2015](#); [Bazzi and Blattman, 2014](#); [Besley and Persson, 2008](#)). Another strand of the literature emphasizes the role of political and ethnic grievances in shaping intrastate conflicts ([Jakobsen and De Soysa, 2009](#); [Horowitz, 2000](#)). [Arbatlı et al. \(2020\)](#) argue that interpersonal population diversity is the underlying determinant of intrasocietal conflicts. I find that the recent rise in civil conflict in Ethiopia is partly explained by ethnic militias' targeting of non-indigenous civilians in resettlement districts. Resettlement-induced diversity can generate a fertile ground for the activation of ethnic divisions and violence targeting outsiders by ethnic actors.

Furthermore, [McGuirk and Nunn \(2024\)](#) find that agricultural projects that displace traditionally pastoral groups increase the risk of conflict. A significant share of the Ethiopian resettlement destinations were inhabited by small ethnic groups who seasonally depended on the land, under flexible customary tenure, for shifting cultivation and nomadic pastoralism ([Pankhurst, 1992](#)). The government's reallocation of land for sedentary agriculture without sufficient considerations of the livelihoods of the indigenous communities may have instilled a deep resentment. Hence, this paper's findings are consistent with [McGuirk and Nunn \(2024\)](#) results on the detrimental effects of mismatched sedentary agricultural projects that expropriate land from indigenous communities.

This paper is also the first study to empirically examine how the 1984-86 Ethiopian resettlement affects socioeconomic outcomes in the destination areas. [Yntiso \(2004\)](#) conducts a case study of resettlement areas in Metekel and documents how the resettlement spurred conflict over resources and power. Early studies of the resettlement have also highlighted how the forced ethnic cohabitation and land dispossession may have instilled deep-rooted grievances between host and settler communities ([Woldemeskel, 1989](#); [Rahmato, 1991](#); [Pankhurst, 1992](#)). I complement the existing qualitative studies of the resettlement by exploring its interactions with ethnic salience and using robust causal inference methods to examine its effects on conflict.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides the background on the resettlement program and the recent changes in ethnic salience, Section 3 discusses the data, Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, Section 5 discusses the main results and robustness checks, Section 6 explores the mechanisms, and Section 7 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 The 1984-86 Resettlement

The 1984-86 resettlement was largely motivated by the government's stated concerns about the suboptimal spatial distribution of the population as well as the unexpected challenges and opportunities that arose due to the 1984 famine. In its *Ten Year Plan for 1984-1993*, formulated prior to the famine, the government had planned to resettle 3-4 million people arguing that "*while we have heavy concentrations of people in the highlands, lowland areas with scarce population and large fertile lands remain underutilized*" ([RRC, 1985a](#)). In 1984, Ethiopia experienced a severe drought that contributed to famine, particularly in the northern highlands already encumbered by low agricultural productivity due to land overuse and degradation.² The government accelerated the resettlement plan to address both the immediate famine issue and the population distribution concerns ([RRC, 1985b](#)).

A new plan, called the "*Action Programme*", was adopted in October 1984 to permanently resettle 1.5 million people. The program promised the settlers, who largely originated from areas densely populated and/or severely affected by the drought, free and adequate land, agricultural inputs, and government services to become self-sufficient within three years ([RRC, 1985a](#)). The government saw the resettlement as both an emergency relief measure to relocate famine victims and a long-term solution to address the deteri-

²See Figure A1 for the spatial distribution of drought severity and population density in 1984. Figure A2 depicts famine severity at the awraja level. The severity of the famine led to highly publicized global relief efforts, including the *Live Aid* concerts, that were organized to generate funds to help famine victims.

oration of agricultural productivity in origin locations (RRC, 1985b). The new program aimed to relocate half of the people it originally intended to resettle over a decade within just a year. The resettlement was implemented with extreme haste. Within six months of the program's commencement, over 340,000 people were already resettled.³

The program came to a halt in January 1986 after over 600,000 people were relocated, driven partly by substantial criticism of the policy and implementation challenges. Non-governmental organizations argued that the resettlement was a pretext to move people aligned with Tigrayan rebels and weaken opposition against the government (Clarke, 1986).⁴ Following reports of officials forcing unwilling famine victims to relocate to meet resettlement quotas, there was international condemnation of the program's use of force and haphazard implementation (Pankhurst, 1992; Kloos and Aynalem, 1989). In response, donor countries prohibited the use of relief funds for the resettlement. Officials within the government also disagreed about the merit and scope of the program due to its deviations from the Ten Year Plan and the lack of resources to implement it successfully. The head of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), who initially led the resettlement program, defected to the United States, citing opposition to the central leadership and its ill-conceived policies (Wolde Giorgis, 1989).

2.2 Settling the Newcomers

As Figure 2 shows, the settlers mainly came from the northern highlands and densely populated areas in the south, and they were relocated to the lowlands in western and southwestern regions. They were distributed across 92 districts over 5 provinces. Among the destination districts, the settlers accounted for 11.3% of the total district population on average. There was substantial variation in the resettlement intensity across districts, ranging up to 85% of the population in some districts.

The resettlement program, both in the selection of the people to be relocated as well as the origin and destination sites, was characterized by a severe lack of consideration for the rights of the resettled and host communities. According to policymakers, the origins and the number of people to be resettled were to be determined based on four criteria: (1) incidence of recurrent drought, (2) extent of land degradation, (3) population density, and (4) unsuitable terrain for agriculture (Clarke, 1986). However, officials were provided with out-resettlement quotas for their jurisdiction based on province targets without a


³Figure A3 shows the total number of people resettled by origin province and month.

⁴Amhara and Tigrayan settlers accounted for 64% and 15% of the resettled population, respectively. Furthermore, there were no settlers from Eritrea despite rebel activity in the former province. Hence, the claim that the resettlement was intended to depopulate rebel strongholds may not have strong empirical support.

thorough consideration of local factors. Given bureaucratic incentives, officials were eager to meet their assigned quotas, including through the use of force and ignoring the aforementioned criteria (Rahmato, 1991; Pankhurst, 1992).⁵

While the individuals resettled in the initial phase of the program may have volunteered, given the famine severity and limited land access in their homelands, there is substantial evidence that people were also forced to resettle. Furthermore, the forced nature of the program is also evinced by the fact that the resettled were restricted from returning to their homelands, and those who tried to return faced imprisonment (Pankhurst, 1992).

Figure 2: Resettlement Origin and Destination Districts



Source: Gebresilasse (2024)'s calculation based on data from CSO (1991).

There was also a shocking level of negligence in how the government decided on the resettlement destinations. The head of the RRC argued that the selection of resettlement sites was largely dictated by the whims of the president – “Mengistu [the president] started traveling around Ethiopia looking for sites on his own. He flew over Kaffa, Wollega, Ilubabor, and Gambela and was impressed by the dense forests and abundant water. He made on-the-spot decisions on settlement sites without any research. His flock of planners, economists, and agronomists simply nodded at all his decisions.” (Wolde Giorgis, 1989). In addition to the detrimental long-run effects explored in this paper, the resettlement’s haphazard implementa-

⁵Gebresilasse (2024) shows that beyond the local agroclimatic factors, such as the severity of the drought and population density in 1984, the centrally imposed district quotas shaped the variation in resettlement intensity across origin districts. Given this paper’s focus on the effects of the resettlement on the destination districts, I focus the discussion in this section on the determinants of the variation in resettlement intensity across destination districts.

tion also resulted in significant loss of life due to starvation, disease, and harsh conditions during transit and in the resettlement sites that had not been sufficiently prepared.

In Table A1, I evaluate the baseline characteristics that shaped the variation in the incidence and intensity of resettlement inflows across districts. Consistent with the aforementioned claims regarding President Mengistu's decisions, districts that had a greater area under forest cover, more abundant water (as proxied by proximity to rivers), and better land access (as proxied by the average crop area) were more likely to be selected as destinations and received a greater share of settlers. In addition, districts less exposed to the drought in 1984 and on the border were also more likely to receive settlers.

However, the variation in resettlement is uncorrelated with baseline ethnic fractionalization and polarization, or population density. Rahmato (1988) notes that in the Metekel resettlement areas, local officials who were expecting famine victims from the Wolo and Tigray in the north were surprised that the first group of settlers came from Kambatta and Hadiya provinces in the south instead. This anecdote reflects the broader haphazard implementation of the program and lack of deliberation regarding ethnic composition during the resettlement process. Overall, the results in Table A1 demonstrate that agroclimatic factors related to availability of land and water rather than local ethnic and demographic factors shaped the variation in the resettlement intensity.

The resettlement program resulted in unprecedented increase in the ethnic diversity of the destination locations. First, the settlers were already diverse since they originated from different parts of the country. They were composed of Amhara (64% of the resettled population), Tigrayan (15%), Oromo (7%), Kembata (6%), Hadiya (5%), and more than ten other ethnic groups (3%).⁶ Second, the destination districts were already inhabited by diverse indigenous ethnic groups which were often different from the resettled population. As Figure A4 shows, there is also substantial variation in the destination locations of the resettled population. In Section 6.1, I show that the resettlement program led to persistent increases in ethnic fractionalization and polarization in destination districts.

There were two types of resettlement schemes: conventional and integrated. The implementations of the different schemes were largely dependent on land availability. Under the conventional scheme, around 65% of settlers were moved to newly formed villages. Under the integrated scheme, the resettled were placed within existing villages based on land availability. Hence, the conventional resettlements often appeared as islands consisting of outsider ethnicities surrounded by villages comprising mainly indigenous ethnic groups. On the other hand, in the integrated villages, the settlers were embedded within the indigenous communities, which allowed for more contact and integration between

⁶Amhara settlers mainly originated from the famine stricken parts of Wollo province.

the resettled and host populations. In Section 6.4, I show that although the resettlement increased ethnic segregation, the effect was smaller in districts with a larger share of integrated settlers. Hence, the modality of the resettlement may shape the health of interethnic relations and the extent to which the heightening of ethnic tensions nationally affects the likelihood of local conflict.


From the outset, the resettlement had created tensions between the ethnic groups suddenly forced to cohabit. First, ethnolinguistic differences made social relations difficult. The head of resettlement program noted that *"the old inhabitants were resentful of the new settlers. They did not share the same language, culture or religion with the newcomers; even their physical features were different"* (Wolde Giorgis, 1989). Second, the land was reallocated without due consideration of settlers' and hosts' rights. Following the land reform, all land belonged to the state, which was unconstrained in allocating (arguably) unused land to settlers. However, indigenous communities often depended on the land under customary tenure for shifting cultivation and nomadic pastoralism, and were sometimes forced to accommodate the newcomers (Holcomb, 1985). In 1988, 43% of resettlement districts reported linguistic problems due to differences in settlers' ethnic origins and 4.4% faced social integration challenges due to conflict (CSA, 1991b). In Metekel awraja, Pankhurst and Piguet (2009) report that *"land dispossession and marginalization triggered local resistance and consequent bloody confrontations between the Gumuz [indigenous ethnic group] and the settlers"* on nine occasions between 1985 and 1994. Overall, the resettlement increased ethnic diversity and seeded grievances that could be reactivated by ethnic actors.

Given the substantial scale of the program, the limited incidence of conflict in resettlement areas in the short-run is notable. This may reflect the fact that the resettlement was seen as an emergency measure to aid famine victims and the program received substantial support from the dictatorial Derg regime that suppressed opposition. Indigenous communities sympathetic to the famine victims played an important role in welcoming the settlers, including building temporary housing in resettlement sites and sharing supplies with the newcomers (Pankhurst, 1992). While the resettlement areas occasionally experienced skirmishes between different ethnic groups, as Figure 1 shows, frequency of conflicts was similarly very low in resettlement and non-resettlement districts for years after the resettlement. However, there was a stark rise in the incidence and severity of conflicts targeting civilians, particularly in high resettlement districts, starting in 2015. In the following section, I discuss how the nationwide spread of protests organized along ethnic lines, for reasons unrelated to the resettlement, increased the salience of ethnicity and contributed to the activation of ethnic grievances and conflict in resettlement districts.

2.3 Protests and the Increased Salience of Ethnicity

The rise in nationwide ethnic salience in 2015 was ignited by protests, initially led by Oromo students, against the 2014 Addis Ababa Master Plan's proposed expansion of the boundaries of the city into Oromia. The expansion aimed to accommodate the increasing demand for land following the capital's economic boom. The protesters denounced the lack of consultation with the impacted communities and the violation of the territorial integrity of Oromia. Even after the government abandoned the Master Plan, the protests spread nationwide and galvanized ethnic mobilization, strengthened by grievances of persistent ethnic and economic inequality, and political marginalization of major ethnic groups, particularly the Oromo and Amhara (Raleigh and Pinaud, 2017). Figure 3 shows a steep rise in the number of protests starting in November 2015 that persisted for months. At the peak in 2016, there were close to 90 protests per month.

Figure 3: Nationwide Protests and Heightening of Ethnic Salience



Source: The line plots present the 12-month rolling averages of the number of protests from ACLED (in blue) and the relative interest in domestic Google Trends searches for major ethnic group names (in black). The bar graph (red) shows the percentage of respondents in Afrobarometer surveys who stated that they identify more or only with their ethnic group compared to the Ethiopian national identity.

Figure 3 shows that the mobilization of protests was followed by a stark increase in ethnic salience nationwide. The plot presents two alternative measures of ethnic salience.

The first measure of ethnic salience is calculated using monthly data on the relative interest in domestic Google Trends searches for the names of the major ethnic groups within Ethiopia.⁷ The second ethnic salience measure is the percentage of respondents in Afrobarometer surveys who identify more or only with their ethnic group over their national identity. Both measures show a stark increase in ethnic identification in Ethiopia starting in 2015. The Afrobarometer surveys show that the percentage of respondents who identify more or only with their ethnic group almost doubled from 13% in 2013 to 25% in 2020. While ethnic salience has decreased moderately since its peak in 2016, it is still considerably higher than the pre-2015 level.

The protests were not directly related to the 1984-86 resettlement program, as they were ignited by opposition to Addis Ababa's expansion plan, far from the resettlement districts. Furthermore, as shown in Section 6.3, there were no differential incidence of protests in resettlement districts. However, the concerns about ethnic inequality and land dispossession that dominated opposition against Addis Ababa's expansion plan may have particular resonance among indigenous groups affected by the 1984-86 resettlement program. The protests led to an exogenous change in ethnic salience nationwide that may have implications for ethnic relations across the diverse resettlement districts.

Overall, the variation in the historical resettlement intensity across districts combined with the nationwide rise in ethnic salience due to factors orthogonal to the resettlement provide a unique opportunity to study how forced ethnic cohabitation affects conflict, particularly those targeting out-groups, when interethnic differences become salient.

3 Data

I compile and harmonize data from multiple sources to measure variation in historical resettlement intensity and long-run changes in conflict and social relations across Ethiopian districts. Since the original resettlement data are reported using 1984 administrative units, I harmonize all district-level variables to 1984 district (*woreda*) boundaries.

Resettlement Intensity: I measure historical resettlement intensity using data from Gebresilas (2024), which digitizes the 1991 *Report on census of population and housing and on survey of demographic changes in the resettlement areas* (CSO, 1991). The report records the total number of people resettled into each destination district under the 1984-86 program. I define resettlement intensity as the ratio of in-resettled population to the sum of the

⁷Murad et al. (2024) follows a similar approach in using Google Trends data to measure ethnic salience and discrimination.

pre-resettlement district population in the 1984 census and the resettled population. I also digitized the *Report on the Survey of Community Level Variables of Resettlement Areas* (1988) (CSA, 1991b) to compile data on the initial characteristics of resettlement areas.

Conflict Outcomes: The main conflict outcomes come from ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010), which provides geocoded information on the date, type, actors, and fatalities of conflict events based on reports from local and international media and NGOs. I focus on the incidence and severity of *Civilian Targeting* events, which capture direct violence against civilians, including attacks, explosions, riots, and mob violence in which civilians are the primary or sole targets. The *Civilian Targeting* category excludes cases in which civilians are harmed incidentally, such as battles with civilian casualties, and thus provides a direct measure of violence targeting civilians, including those resettled under the 1984 program.

Ethnic Diversity: I measure district-level ethnic diversity using aggregated ethnic population shares from 10% individual-level samples of Ethiopia’s 1984, 1994, and 2007 censuses (Minnesota Population Center, 2024). Fractionalization is defined as $F = 1 - \sum_{g=1}^G \pi_g^2$, where G is the number of ethnic groups in the district and π_g is group g ’s population share. It captures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different ethnic groups. Polarization is defined as $P = \sum_{i=1}^G \sum_{j=1}^G \pi_i^2 \pi_j d_{ij}$, where d_{ij} denotes linguistic distance between groups i and j , which proxies for differences in preferences across groups (Fearon, 2003). This measure captures the extent of inter-group differences, weighted by group sizes and linguistic distance. As Figure A5 shows, fractionalization and polarization are highly correlated in Ethiopia.

Ethnic Spatial Distribution and Wealth Inequality: I use individual-level census data from Central Statistical Agency (2024) to construct measures of ethnic spatial segregation, isolation, and exposure to non-dominant groups across villages within each district. I also use household wealth and land ownership data from the 2011 Demographic Health Survey (Boyle et al., 2019) to construct awraja-level measures of between- and within-ethnic-group wealth and land inequality using the Theil index (Theil, 1967).

Ethnic Identification and Trust: I use individual-level geocoded data from all the available rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys (Afrobarometer, 2025) that were conducted in Ethiopia, 2013 (Round 5), 2020 (Round 8) and 2023 (Round 9), to examine how ethnic identification and trust respond to the interactions between historical resettlement patterns and national changes in the salience of ethnicity. In addition, the Afrobarometer

surveys also provide detailed information on respondents' socioeconomic characteristics and their views regarding safety, ethnic relations, and economic and political conditions.

Agroclimatic and Geographic Controls: I control for pre-resettlement district characteristics using data from Gebresilasse (2024), which digitizes district-level agricultural and socioeconomic information for 1982 and 1983 from *The General Agricultural Survey* (EPPD and Department, 1984). I measure drought severity using remote-sensing data on the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010), tree cover using NASA's Vegetation Continuous Fields dataset (Hansen, 2018), and remoteness and access to water using average distance to the nearest administrative capitals and rivers. I also construct a district-level Transhumant Pastoral Index following McGuirk and Nunn (2025), based on the Ethnographic Atlas and Murdock's Map of Ethnic Groups (Kincaide et al., 2025).

4 Empirical Strategy

As the discussion in Section 2 highlighted, there was a sharp increase in ethnic identification in Ethiopia starting in 2015, precipitated by protests against a plan to expand the boundaries of Addis Ababa that subsequently spread nationwide. This paper examines how the historical resettlement affects conflict outcomes during periods of heightened ethnic salience nationally. To this end, the main identification strategy employs a difference-in-differences design that exploits the variation in historical in-resettlement intensity across districts and compares changes in conflict outcomes across these locations before and after the national rise in ethnic salience in 2015.

The main specification is as follows:

$$Y_{dpt} = \beta * InReset_d X Post2015_t + \eta_d + \delta_{pt} + \Lambda * BaselineControls_d X Post2015_t + \epsilon_{dt} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{dpt} are outcomes of interest such as conflict incidence in district d within province p in year t , $InReset_d$ is the population in-resettled during 1984-86 as a share of the district population inclusive of the settlers, $Post2015_t$ equals 1 for years after 2015, η_d are district fixed effects, and δ_{pt} are province-by-year fixed effects. The district fixed effects account for any time-invariant district characteristics (such as terrain, agroclimatic suitability, proximity to major cities) that can affect resettlement intensity and conflict outcomes. The province-by-year fixed effects flexibly allow for differential trends by provinces due to account for province-specific factors that may shape trends in conflict across provinces.

Given the difference-in-differences design, two key assumptions are needed for the identification strategy to provide causal estimates on how the interaction between historical in-resettlement intensity and recently heightened ethnic salience affects conflict outcomes. First, in the absence of national-level heightening of ethnic salience starting in 2015, the incidence and severity of conflict between high and low resettlement destination districts would have evolved in a similar manner. Second, to attribute the changes in conflict outcomes by resettlement status in the post-2015 period to be solely to the interactions between historical resettlement and the heightening of national ethnic tensions, there must be no other concurrent changes that could similarly interact with resettlement.

There are several facts that provide credible support for the main identifying assumptions. As Figure 1 shows, the frequency of conflicts targeting civilians was trending in an identical manner, at low levels, in resettlement and non-resettlement districts prior to the rise in ethnic salience in 2015. However, I employ an event study specification to rigorously evaluate concerns regarding pre-existing differential trends in conflict outcomes between districts that differ in resettlement intensity. While the examination of pre-trends does not fully rule out the potential divergence in post-treatment outcomes for reasons unrelated to resettlement or ethnic salience, the analysis is informative about the extent to which the parallel trends assumption is reasonable. The event study specification, described in the equation below, also allows for the examination of the dynamic interactions between historical resettlement intensity and the recent activation of ethnic tensions.

$$Y_{dpt} = \sum_{j \neq 2015} \beta_j * InReset_dX \mathbb{1}_{t=j} + \eta_d + \delta_{pt} + \sum_s \sum_{j \neq 2015} \lambda_{sj} * BaselineControls_dX \mathbb{1}_{t=j} + \epsilon_{dt} \quad (2)$$

Figure 3 shows that there was a sharp rise in ethnic salience in Ethiopia after 2015. This trend is consistent both when proxying for ethnic salience using the intensity of Google searches of ethnic group names within Ethiopia as well as using survey-based measures of identification with own ethnic group over the national identity from the Afrobarometer surveys. While it is difficult to fully rule out other concurrent changes, these results do highlight that the post-2015 period is marked by heightened levels of ethnic salience and identification, and provide some support for the third identifying assumption. To get at whether the changes post-2015 are attributable to the interactions between resettlement intensity and ethnic salience, I also evaluate the robustness of the main findings to directly measuring the heightening of ethnic salience using a continuous domestic Google search-based measure of ethnic salience instead of the binary post-2015 indicator.

Given the difference-in-differences design, the identification assumption does not require the resettlement intensity to vary randomly across districts, but rather that these

differences would not have a differential impact on conflict after 2015. Nonetheless, as Table A1 shows, resettlement intensity is not correlated with key baseline characteristics, such as population density and ethnic composition. The resettlement was implemented hastily without sufficient consideration of destination characteristics, and the resettled population had no say in where they ended up. The head of the organization charged with implementing the resettlement stated that *“He [the president] made on-the-spot decisions on settlement sites without any research. His flock of planners, economists, and agronomists, simply nodded at all his decisions”* (Wolde Giorgis, 1989). However, Table A1 also shows that high-resettlement districts are more likely to be on the border, less exposed to drought in 1984, and have greater tree cover. The main specification directly accounts for the potential confounding effects of correlates of resettlement by controlling for the interactions between the post-treatment indicator and a set of key baseline district characteristics (district border status, population density, drought severity, fractionalization, and polarization).

The main estimation sample excludes origin districts, due to the concern that they were directly affected by the resettlement, and all districts in Tigray province, given the differential trends this province may have experienced after the rise of TPLF and the recent conflict in the region which is orthogonal to the resettlement issue. In addition, the discussion in Section 2 shows that border districts were more likely to be resettlement destinations. I evaluate the robustness of the results to including origin districts or districts from Tigray, excluding districts from each of the provinces one at a time, focusing on non-border districts, or restricting the estimation sample to only destination districts. In the analysis which restricts to only destination districts, the identifying variation comes from comparing resettlement districts that differ from each other in the magnitude of the relocated population relative to the initial district population size.

I also conduct several checks that evaluate the robustness of the main findings to alternative outcome measures, treatment definitions, sample restrictions, and alternative specifications. In addition to the controls included in the main specifications, I also examine whether the key findings are robust to accounting for the direct confounding effects of a battery of additional baseline characteristics that can affect both the probability of in-resettlement and conflict outcomes, including a demanding set of awraja-year fixed effects or simplifying the empirical specification to exclude all additional controls.

To account for serial and spatial correlation, I calculate Conley (1999) standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km.⁸

⁸All the estimates are generated using the R package from Berge et al. (2023).

5 Results

5.1 Resettlement and Conflict

In this section, I present the main results on how historical resettlement intensity affects the incidence and severity of conflicts when ethnic divisions become salient nationwide.

Table 1 examines the effects on incidence and fatalities from all conflicts as well as those mainly targeting civilians. Across the board, high-resettlement destination districts experience substantial increases in overall conflict incidence and fatalities during the period of heightened ethnic tensions. Columns (1) and (3) show that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of the population in-resettled results in 6.9% and 5.7% increase in incidence of any conflict and those targeting civilians, respectively. Similarly, columns (2) and (4) report that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of resettled population results in a 11.2% and 10.5% increase in fatalities from any conflict and conflicts specifically targeting civilians, during the period of heightened ethnic salience. In combination, these results highlight that long after the implementation of the resettlement program, high-resettlement districts experience more frequent and severe conflicts, particularly those targeting civilians, when interethnic cleavages become salient.

Table 1: Resettlement and Conflict Incidence and Severity


	Log Number of			
	All Conflicts		Civilian Targetings	
	Events	Fatalities	Events	Fatalities
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.069** (0.031)	0.112*** (0.040)	0.057*** (0.019)	0.105*** (0.035)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	10,233	10,233	10,233	10,233

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Figure 4 presents the dynamics in how resettlement affects the incidence and fatalities

of conflict events targeting civilians using the event study specification. First, the results show that there were no differential trends in incidence or fatalities due to conflicts targeting civilians prior to the rise in ethnic tensions after 2015. Furthermore, following the heightening of ethnic tensions in the post 2015 period, there is a substantial and increasing prevalence and severity of conflicts targeting civilians in districts with a greater share of in-resettled population. Figure A6 shows similar patterns in how resettlement intensity affects incidence and fatalities when considering all conflict events.

Figure 4: In-Resettlement and Conflicts Targeting Civilians



Notes: The graphs plot the point values and 95% confidence intervals for the estimates on how in-resettlement intensity affects incidence and fatalities from conflicts targeting civilians using the event study specification defined in equation 2. I calculate Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km.

Overall, the event study results provide strong support for the identifying assumption that the likelihood and severity of conflict would have remained similar in the absence of the nationwide rise in ethnic salience in the post 2015 period. Consistent with the increasing salience of ethnic tensions in recent years, resettlement districts experience a steep rise in violence targeting civilians. Furthermore, the lack of significant differences in conflict intensity between high and low resettlement districts prior to 2015 shows that resettlement on its own may not necessarily cause conflict in destination districts. However, during periods of heightened ethnic tensions, resettlement destinations may face greater risk of conflict due to the potential activation of the dormant ethnic and social cleavages that were created by the historical population relocation schemes.

5.2 Resettlement and Involvement of Ethnic Actors Targeting Civilians

In Table 2, I examine how in-resettlement intensity affects incidence of conflict targeting civilians by the type of actors perpetuating the violence. Columns (1)-(5) use ACLED's classification of actors in conflicts involving interactions with civilians to disaggregate the number of civilian targeting events by mutually exclusive perpetrator types. ACLED defines political militias as armed groups with political goals that use violence where as identity militias are defined as armed and violent groups organized around a collective, common feature, such as ethnic identity. However, some groups defined as political militias, such as the *Fano Youth Militia*, in the ACLED dataset are also shaped by ethnic identity considerations. In column (6), I determine the involvement of ethnic actors by considering cases in which ACLED's descriptions of the conflict actor/associated actors targeting civilians match the word "Ethnic" (e.g. "Unidentified Ethnic Militia").

Table 2: Effects on Conflict by Actors Targeting Civilians

:	Log Number of Conflict Events Targeting Civilians By Perpetrator Types					By Ethnic
	Political militia	Identity militia	State forces	Rioters	Rebels	Actors
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.053*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.009)	-0.013 (0.009)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.042*** (0.010)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	10,233	10,233	10,233	10,233	10,233	10,233

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

As Table 2 shows, the increase in violence targeting civilians in high-resettlement districts is mainly driven by militias. In addition, the lack of effect on conflicts targeting civilians by state forces corroborates that the effect of resettlement and ethnic salience estimated in Table 1 is not picking up government-related conflicts or violent responses to protests. Furthermore, Columns (2) and (6) consistently show that militias organized along ethnic identity lines substantially contribute to the observed increase in violence targeting civilians in high-resettlement districts.

The above results highlight that civilian targetings in high-resettlement districts are perpetrated by ethnic actors. In Table 3, I examine the ethnic and occupational identity of the civilians targeted in these conflicts.⁹ In high-resettlement districts, the violence mainly targets out-group communities, particularly Amhara civilians who accounted for 64% of initial settlers. In contrast, there is no comparable violence targeting Oromo civilians, who are more likely to be indigenous in destination areas and less exposed to violence aimed at outsiders. The absence of an effect on the targeting of Tigrayan civilians is also reassuring, as it suggests the main estimates are not simply capturing spillovers from the post-2020 conflict in northern Ethiopia. In addition, farmers, who are likely to include historically resettled populations, are also significantly targeted in high-resettlement districts.

Table 3: Civilian Targetings by Victims' Ethnicity and Occupation

	Log Number of Civilian Targeting Events By Civilians' Ethnicity			Occupation
	Amhara	Tigrayan	Oromo	Farmers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.015*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.010*** (0.003)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	10,233	10,233	10,233	10,233

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Overall, these results underscore that the increase in conflict in resettlement districts after 2015 reflects the differential impact of rising ethnic salience in historically resettled districts that are characterized by a significant presence of non-indigenous ethnicities and latent interethnic cleavages seeded by the resettlement program.

⁹I classify victims using the associated actor categorization, which identifies civilian actors' characteristics (e.g. "Amhara Ethnic Group" or "Farmers (Ethiopia)"). The results are qualitatively similar when victim identity is instead coded from event descriptions that mention an ethnic group or farmer status.

5.3 Robustness

So far, I find that high resettlement intensity districts experience greater incidence and severity of conflicts targeting civilians when ethnic identity becomes salient nationwide. In this section, I show the robustness of the main findings to additional checks.

Alternative Treatment and Salience Measures: Table A3 shows that the main findings are qualitatively similar when treatment is defined by any in-resettlement presence, by the logarithm of the number of people resettled, or by interacting resettlement intensity with a continuous measure of ethnic salience based on domestic Google searches for major ethnic group names instead of a post-2015 indicator.¹⁰

Measuring Conflict on the Extensive Margin: Instead of using log transformations of the outcomes, Table A4 examines the effects on any incidence of conflict event or fatality. Consistent with the main results, the probability of conflicts targeting civilians and associated fatalities increase substantially in higher resettlement districts.

Alternative Sample Restrictions: Columns (1)–(2) of Table A5 show that including resettlement origins and Tigrayan districts in the estimation leaves the results unchanged. Columns (3)–(7) sequentially exclude each destination province, with similar estimates throughout. Column (8) shows that the result is robust to excluding all border districts, which received more settlers and are vulnerable to violence due to ethnic partitioning (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016). Finally, column (9) restricts the sample to destination districts to address remaining concerns that destination and non-resettlement districts may differ systematically, and the estimate remains qualitatively similar.

Alternative Specifications: Table A6 shows that the main result is robust to alternative specifications. Column (1) drops controls for correlates of in-resettlement, column (2) replaces province-by-year with *awraja*-by-year fixed effects, column (3) estimates a simple difference-in-differences without controls, and columns (4)–(6) control for the effects of the set of baseline correlates of resettlement documented in Table A1. Across specifications, the estimated effect of resettlement on conflicts targeting civilians remains similar.

State Capacity and Mobile Access: Rather than heightened ethnic salience, the post-2015 rise in conflict in high-resettlement areas may reflect weakening state capacity or

¹⁰Figure 3 shows that the search-based measure closely tracks the rise in ethnic identification since 2015.

expanding mobile connectivity. Tables [A7](#) addresses these concerns by controlling for national state-capacity measures ([O'Reilly and Murphy, 2022](#)), using lagged values to mitigate endogeneity concerns, and district-level annual 2G coverage constructed using population and cell-tower data ([Liu et al., 2024](#); [OpenCellID, 2025](#)). While weaker state capacity and poor connectivity amplify the effect of resettlement on conflict, the core finding of increased conflict in resettlement districts after 2015 remains robust.

Accounting for Ethnic Shares: A potential concern is that the post-2015 violence mainly reflects settlers aligned with ethnically organized rebel groups, especially given claims that the Derg used resettlement for demographic engineering. A related question is whether the effect of resettlement on conflict is driven solely by demographic change. Tables [A8](#) and [A13](#) address these concerns by controlling for post-resettlement ethnic shares and diversity in 1994 and 2007. Although these variables are “bad controls” because they were themselves shaped by the program ([Forney et al., 2022](#)), the effect of resettlement remains significant. Hence, the resettlement affects conflict not only through changes in ethnic composition but also through the way it structured interethnic contact.

Protests and State Responses: Table [A14](#) examines whether the post-2015 rise in ethnic salience may have been partly driven by developments in resettlement areas. As discussed in Section [2](#), the nationwide surge was triggered by protests over Addis Ababa’s expansion, far from the resettlement districts. Resettlement areas are peripheral and sparsely populated, making them unlikely drivers of national dynamics. If local diversity or discord in resettlement areas had fueled ethnic salience nationwide, such effects should have emerged well before 2015. Consistent with this, Table [A14](#) shows no effect on protest incidence, helping rule out the possibility that the main findings capture protest activity or associated state repression rather than violence targeting civilians.

Alternative Conflict Measures: Since ACLED relies on media reports, one concern is that the rise in violence may reflect greater reporting in resettlement areas. ACLED expanded nationwide coverage via the Ethiopia Peace Observatory only in 2021, whereas Figure [4](#) shows that conflict in high-resettlement districts was already rising by 2018. Furthermore, alternative, non-media-based measures point in the same direction. Using Afrobarometer surveys, Table [A9](#) shows that individuals in high-resettlement districts become more likely to report feeling unsafe, fearing crime, and unfair ethnic treatment. In addition, Figure [A12](#) shows that resettlement districts were significantly more likely to generate internal displacement during 2017–2020 ([International Organization for Migration, 2026](#)).

6 Mechanisms

The results consistently show that, several decades after the 1984-86 emergency resettlement, districts with a greater share of population in-resettled experience higher rates of conflict during the period of heightened ethnic tensions. The increase in violence is driven by ethnic militias' targeting of civilians, particularly non-indigenous residents. In this section, I present the key mechanisms that explain how the historical resettlement interacted with the recent rise in ethnic tensions to exacerbate conflict in resettlement destinations.


The resettlement exacerbated conflict in the long run through two key channels. First, it sharply increased ethnic diversity in destination districts that made these communities vulnerable to violence when ethnic tensions flare. Second, the program's rushed and coercive implementation, which resulted in land dispossession and early clashes along ethnic lines, seeded grievances between settlers and hosts that can be politically activated by actors when ethnicity becomes salient. Furthermore, resettlement areas exhibit higher ethnic wealth inequality today, deepening cleavages and making grievance mobilization easier. Consistent with these mechanisms, the effects on conflict and ethnic identification are strongest in resettlement areas with a larger increase in diversity, greater initial social integration difficulties, and persistent ethnic wealth stratification. Following the rise in the salience of ethnicity nationwide, individuals in resettlement districts, particularly those indigenous to the area, are more likely to identify with their ethnic group rather than their nationality identity and allege ethnic grievance.¹¹ There is also a reduction in trust of neighbors, particularly among the non-indigenous residents vulnerable to the violence.

6.1 Resettlement and Diversity

Using a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits the variation in in-resettlement intensity across districts and changes in population composition over 1984-2007, I examine how the resettlement shaped ethnic diversity in the long-run. Figure 5 presents the event-study results in how in-resettlement intensity affects ethnic fractionalization (a) and polarization (b). The results show that the resettlement had a persistent effect in increasing ethnic fractionalization and polarization in destination districts several decades after the implementation of the program. Furthermore, Table A2 also shows that high-resettlement districts still have a greater share of residents from the main resettled ethnicities, particularly of Amhara ethnic group who accounted for 64% of the initial settlers.

¹¹The increase in ethnic identification in high-resettlement locations may be both the result of activation of ethnic identity due to national-level changes as well as a consequence of the observed increase in ethnic conflict in the later periods.

Figure 5: Effects of Resettlement on Ethnic Diversity



Notes: The graphs plot the point values and 95% confidence intervals for the estimates on how in-resettlement affects ethnic fractionalization and polarization.

The persistent changes in ethnic diversity of resettlement destinations would be expected for four reasons. First, the settlers were already diverse since the program forcibly relocated people from different ethnicities. Second, the destination areas were also composed of diverse indigenous ethnicities who were often distinct from the settlers. In addition, the rise in ethnic polarization is also expected since the resettlement program facilitated the relocation of northern ethnic groups (particularly Amhara and Tigrayan) along with other populations from the southern highlands (such as Hadiya and Kembata) in ethnic homelands of indigenous groups with substantial linguistic and cultural differences. Finally, the substantial scale of the program and various barriers that initially limited the settlers' ability to leave the resettlement, such as the punitive directive by the government that forbade leaving resettlement areas (Pankhurst, 1992).

6.2 The Mediating Effects of Ethnic Diversity

The results thus far show that the resettlement led to a substantial and persistent increase in ethnic diversity and presence of individuals from non-indigenous ethnic groups in destination locations. In this section, I examine whether and how the increased ethnic diversity in resettlement destinations explain the observed rise in conflict.

In particular, I estimate whether the changes in district ethnic fractionalization and polarization over 1984-1994 affect the frequency and fatalities from conflicts targeting civilians. Hence, the analyses from these specifications are informative about how the changes in diversity, partially induced by the resettlement program as shown in Figure 5, shape

conflict during periods of heightened ethnic salience nationally. I estimate these specifications considering the baseline sample as well as restricting to only destination districts. In the latter specification, the identifying variation comes from the changes in diversity between 1984 and 2007 within resettlement districts.

The estimating equation is as follows:

$$Y_{dt} = \beta * \Delta Fractionalization_d \times Post2015_t + \phi * \Delta Polarization_d \times Post2015_t + \eta_d + \delta_{pt} + \Lambda * BaselineXs_d \times Post2015_t + \Gamma X_{dt} + \epsilon_{dt} \quad (3)$$

The change in ethnic diversity is calculated using the 1984 and 1994 censuses to closely capture the change in diversity induced by the resettlement and avoid reverse causality concerns since the measure predates any of the conflict outcomes (which are available since 1998) or the spike in the salience of ethnic identity that occurred after 2015.¹²

Table 4: Changes in Ethnic Diversity over 1984-1994 and Conflict

	Baseline Sample		Only In-Resettlement Districts	
	Log Number of Conflict Events			
	All Conflicts	Civilian Targetings	All Conflicts	Civilian Targetings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Fractionalization (1994-1984) $\times$ Post-2015	0.159 (0.242)	0.002 (0.111)	-0.245 (0.364)	-0.070 (0.258)
Δ Polarization (1994-1984) $\times$ Post-2015	1.674*** (0.621)	2.151*** (0.357)	2.779** (1.317)	2.869*** (0.895)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	8,127	8,127	1,620	1,620

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table 4 shows that districts with a larger increase in ethnic polarization experience significant rise in conflict during periods of heightened ethnic tensions. These patterns are robust in the full sample and when restricting to destination districts to exploit only within-destination variation in ethnic change likely induced by the resettlement.¹³ Figure

¹²However, in Table 4, I show that estimated effects of changes in diversity on conflict are similar if we consider the changes in diversity between 1984-2007.

¹³After controlling for ethnic polarization, fractionalization does not have a robust effect on conflict. However, these estimates should be interpreted cautiously given the high correlation between ethnic fractionalization and polarization reported in Figure A5. Indeed, Table A12 shows that change in ethnic fractionalization, when considered without controlling for polarization, also has a significant effect on conflict.

A7 indicates no pre-treatment differential trends, but districts with larger historical increases in ethnic diversity experienced significantly higher civilian-targeted violence during periods of heightened ethnic salience. Furthermore, Table A10 shows that conflict incidence and severity are larger in high-resettlement districts located in provinces with a greater ethnic fractionalization of initial settlers. These results provide additional support to the argument that historical resettlement influences recent conflict through the effect it had in shaping ethnic diversity in destination districts that increased the vulnerability of the non-indigenous populations during periods of heightened ethnic salience.

6.3 Activation of Grievances and Ethnic Identity

The event-study estimates in Figures 4 and A7 show no persistent link between resettlement and conflict prior to 2015, despite substantial increases in ethnic diversity in resettlement districts. Why does the historical resettlement affect conflict after 2015? This section provides evidence that while diversity alone does not increase conflict, resettlement districts with initial integration challenges and contemporary ethnic wealth disparities saw more conflict when national shocks activate ethnic identities and latent grievances¹⁴.

The 1987/88 census of resettlement villages (CSA, 1991b) documented several causes of initial social integration difficulties such as communal violence, poor governance, poverty, and religious and cultural differences.¹⁵ For instance, 4.4% of resettlements reported initial social integration problems due to violence between neighbors and communities. In addition to the increased diversity which makes resettlement areas vulnerable to interethnic conflict, the initial implementation of the program which led to communal violence, land dispossession, and other integration challenges may have also instilled deep-seated cleavages that could be reawakened when ethnic tensions rise.

Table 5 provides evidence that the post-2015 rise in violence partly reflects the reactivation of dormant interethnic cleavages. I exploit variation across awrajas in initial social integration problems, and construct an index capturing the share of resettlement villages reporting integration difficulties. High-resettlement districts located in awrajas with greater initial integration problems, particularly due to communal violence and cultural differences, experience higher rates of civilian-targeted violence after 2015. Overall, these results suggest that the national shock to interethnic relations reawakened dormant cleavages in high-resettlement districts and reignited civil conflict.¹⁶

¹⁴Table A13 runs a horse-race between resettlement intensity and the changes in ethnic diversity, and shows that resettlement significantly affects conflict even after controlling for the effects of ethnic composition.

¹⁵See Figure A9 for the reported importance of different causes of initial social integration difficulties.

¹⁶Table A18 presents the results for all the causes of initial integration problems reported in CSA (1991b).

Table 5: Reactivation of Conflict by Initial Social Integration Problems

	Log Number of Conflicts Targeting Civilians			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.153*** (0.036)	0.006 (0.014)	0.034** (0.014)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Social Problems Index $\times$ Post-2015	0.017 (0.017)			
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Violence $\times$ Post-2015		0.032*** (0.006)		
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Culture $\times$ Post-2015			0.016* (0.009)	
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Land $\times$ Post-2015				-0.015 (0.011)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Awraja-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Using individual-level data from Afrobarometer surveys (2013, 2020 and 2023), Table 6 examines how ethnic identification and trust respond to heightened ethnic salience. Panel A shows that, after the nationwide rise in ethnic tensions, individuals in high-resettlement districts are more likely to identify with their ethnic group over the nation, less likely to trust neighbors, and more likely to perceive ethnic discrimination.¹⁷

Panel B of Table 6 tests whether the changes in ethnic identification and trust differ by indigeneity. Indigenous residents, defined as members of ethnic groups considered local and politically powerful in the region, display sharper increases in ethnic identification. Both indigenous and non-indigenous residents report lower trust of neighbors. However, the mistrust of neighbors is larger for non-indigenous residents. As Table 3 shows, non-indigenous residents, especially Amhara civilians, are targeted in high-resettlement districts. Hence, their reduced trust of neighbors is consistent with these changes. In contrast, column (3) shows no change in non-indigenous residents' trust toward relatives, consistent with a selective erosion of trust toward non-coethnic neighbors. Furthermore, column

¹⁷The event study results in Figure A8 present a similar picture of increased in-group identification.

(4) shows greater ethnic grievance about unfairness among indigenous residents. These patterns align with the main results that the national shock to interethnic relations fueled conflict in high-resettlement districts by exacerbating ethnic identification and eroding interethnic trust.

Table 6: Increased Ethnic Identification and Deterioration of Trust

	Identify More Or Only With Ethnic Group	Trust Neighbors	Relatives	Own Ethnicity Treated Unfairly
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Overall Effects				
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.056*** (0.012)	-0.066*** (0.007)	0.011 (0.019)	0.027 (0.028)
N	4,918	3,356	3,358	4,906
Panel B: Heterogeneity by Indigeneity				
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.039*** (0.010)	-0.077*** (0.009)	0.004 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Indigenous	-0.037** (0.017)	-0.003 (0.020)	0.005 (0.016)	-0.025** (0.012)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015 $\times$ Indigenous	0.013 (0.019)	0.072** (0.029)	0.037*** (0.004)	0.039** (0.018)
N	4,918	3,356	3,358	4,906
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Conley standard errors that are spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

In addition to the historical trauma of the resettlement, grievances due to ethnic wealth disparity also contributed to the reactivation of conflict. Using household wealth data from the 2011 Demographic Health Survey (Boyle et al., 2019), I construct awraja-level measures of between- and within-ethnic-group wealth inequality using the Theil index (Theil, 1967)¹⁸. I measure ethnic wealth stratification as the share of total inequality at-

¹⁸Galor and Wainstock (2025) use a similar approach to decompose income inequality in the US between- and within-ancestral-origins.

tributable to between-ethnic-groups inequality. Table A15 shows that wealth inequality in resettlement areas is largely due to differences between groups, and thus have greater ethnic wealth stratification. This could be partly due to the land redistribution and the higher investment which settler communities received during the early years of the program. In Table 7, I examine whether the effect of resettlement on conflict is mediated by ethnic wealth stratification. High-resettlement districts in awrajas with a greater ethnic stratification experience significantly more conflict. This pattern is robust to controlling for ethnic fractionalization in 2011, which is correlated with ethnic wealth stratification.¹⁹

Table 7: Ethnic Wealth Stratification and Conflict Reactivation

	Log Number of Civilian Targetings			
	All		By Ethnic Actors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.026 (0.020)	0.022 (0.029)	0.026** (0.013)	0.043* (0.023)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015 $\times$ Ethnic Stratification (2011)	0.104* (0.055)	0.098 (0.072)	0.074** (0.033)	0.105** (0.044)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015 $\times$ Fractionalization (2011)		0.011 (0.059)		-0.051 (0.048)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Awraja-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	9,909	9,909	9,909	9,909

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

In Figure A13, I employ Gelbach (2016)'s decomposition method to quantify how much each of the mechanisms considered above explain the estimated effects of resettlement on conflict. While the estimates are not causal, the decomposition suggests that most of the resettlement effect operates through changes in destination areas' ethnic composition and spatial sorting, wealth disparity between ethnicities and initial social integration difficulties while the increased population density slightly offsets these effects.

¹⁹The specification in Table 7 includes awraja-by-year fixed effects to flexibly account for any awraja-level correlates of ethnic wealth disparity. The results are qualitatively similar if we use the province-by-year fixed effects or restricting the estimation sample to only destination districts (Table A16)

Overall, the results suggest that resettlement districts, which had become diverse with large non-indigenous populations and longstanding grievances due to the traumatic resettlement and persisting ethnic inequality, are fertile ground for the activation of ethnic identities, which contributes to the sharp rise in communal violence.

6.4 The Tempering Effects of Integrated Resettlements

The 1984-86 resettlement was implemented under two different schemes: conventional and integrated. Under the conventional schemes, settlers were spatially segregated in ethnic enclaves, albeit within territories dominated by indigenous ethnic groups. In contrast, integrated schemes intermingled settlers with local communities. Hence, examining heterogeneity by the prevalence of integrated resettlement, which generated more interethnic contact, can shed light on how the form of resettlement shapes long-run ethnic conflict.

Integrated resettlement sites were allocated primarily based on land availability within existing villages, with placement continuing as long as it allowed a 2.5-hectare per household landholding (FAO, 1986). Although originally capped at 1,000 households annually, the integrated schemes were rapidly scaled up and relocated more than 71,000 households in just eight months. By its conclusion, integrated schemes accounted for 84% of settlement villages and 35% of settlers. As Figure A10 shows, settlers in integrated and conventional schemes were similar in gender composition, marital status, and willingness to remain in destinations. However, integrated schemes included fewer distinct ethnic groups and a larger share of Tigrayan settlers. Figure A11 further shows that districts with a higher share of integrated resettlement received fewer settlers and had lower access to public goods immediately following resettlement. However, despite the ethnic composition differences, districts with a higher share of integrated resettlement do not report initial social integration problems due to ethnolinguistic differences.

Using individual-level census data, Table A17 documents that resettlement persistently increased ethnic segregation and exposure to non-dominant ethnicities in destination districts.²⁰ Part of the effect of resettlement on segregation and exposure may arise mechanically because the program introduced new ethnicities into previously more homogeneous districts. However, Table A17 indicates that the resettlement scheme also mattered. Districts with a larger share of integrated schemes became significantly less segregated, especially in high-resettlement districts. While integrated resettlements are

²⁰Ethnic segregation is measured using multigroup dissimilarity index to capture how unevenly ethnic groups are distributed across villages within a district. The isolation index captures the extent to which the average individual lives among co-ethnics. The exposure to non-dominant groups index measures how much the average individual is exposed to locally non-dominant ethnic groups.

also less ethnically isolated, this effect is attenuated in districts with more intense resettlement. Overall, the results suggest that the resettlement scheme, in addition to the scale, was central in shaping subsequent demographic interaction.

The differences in ethnic segregation and out-group exposure shaped by the resettlement can influence interethnic relations and cohesion, thereby modulating conflict when ethnic tensions intensify. In Table 8, I estimate the heterogeneous effects of resettlement and ethnic salience by the share of integrated settlers.²¹ Columns (1) and (2) show that individuals in resettlement districts with a greater share of integrated settlers are less likely to identify with their ethnicity and more likely to trust their neighbors during periods of heightened ethnic tensions. Hence, the activation of local ethnic identity is relatively muted in more integrated resettlements. Consistent with this, columns (3) and (4) show that high-resettlement districts with more integrated resettlement sites experience lower incidence of conflict targeting civilians, including those perpetrated by ethnic actors.

Table 8: Heterogeneous Effects by Resettlement Schemes

	Identifies More Or Only With Ethnic Group	Trusts Neighbors	Log Number of Civilian Targetings	
	(1)	(2)	All	By Ethnic Actors
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	-0.066 (0.047)	-0.317*** (0.020)	0.049** (0.022)	0.029* (0.017)
Post-2015 $\times$ Share Integrated ($\div 100$)	-0.226 (0.195)	-0.976*** (0.128)	-0.103** (0.048)	-0.082*** (0.030)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015 $\times$ Share Integrated ($\div 100$)	-0.139** (0.066)	0.309*** (0.055)	-0.199*** (0.032)	-0.122*** (0.017)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓		
Province-Year FEs			✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post			✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post			✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post			✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post			✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post			✓	✓
N	813	558	2,268	2,268

Notes: Column (1) and (2) report standard errors clustered at the district level, and columns (3) and (4) report Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table 8 shows that integrated resettlement had both a direct and moderating effect on

²¹Given the limited number of observations from resettlement districts in the Afrobarometer surveys, the analysis in columns (1) and (2) uses a parsimonious specification that includes district and year fixed effects.

conflict. Fixing districts' resettlement intensity, greater integrated resettlement reduces conflict during periods of heightened ethnic tensions. Moreover, the effect of increased resettlement intensity on conflict is mitigated if it was accompanied by a larger integrated share. Hence, initial integration matters even more when resettlement intensity is high.

While it may not fully address endogeneity concerns, Table A19 shows that the lower conflict incidence in districts with a higher share of integrated settlers is robust to key confounders. In particular, the results are unlikely to be driven by lower settler diversity, smaller scale, or reduced indigenous land dispossession in districts with more integrated settlements. Columns (2) and (3) show that the heterogeneous effects of integration remain qualitatively unchanged after controlling for province-level ethnic diversity of initial settlers and district-level resettlement scale.²² Furthermore, the results are robust to controlling for correlates of integration intensity documented in Figure A11 such as early ethnolinguistic frictions, agroclimatic suitability, access to public goods (health facilities, literacy programs, markets), and the prevalence of slash-and-burn agricultural practices.

Overall, the results in Tables 8 and A19 suggest that integrated resettlements can lessen the detrimental effects of forced cohabitation during rising ethnic tensions. In contrast to conventional resettlement schemes, where the resettled were relocated to new villages consisting of only settlers surrounded by hosts, integrated resettlement schemes may generate greater social linkages and cultural assimilation that foster more trust and unity between the resettled and host populations (Bazzi et al., 2019; Carlitz et al., 2024).

7 Conclusion

This paper studies how ethnic cohabitation induced by a forced resettlement affects conflict in the long run when interethnic cleavages become salient. Exploiting variation in historical resettlement intensity and a nationwide rise in ethnic salience, I find that high-resettlement districts experienced significant increases in violence targeting civilians during periods of heightened ethnic tensions. The violence is mainly perpetrated by ethnic actors, and non-indigenous residents are more likely to be targeted. The effects are larger in districts where the resettled were less integrated with the host communities and with greater ethnic wealth inequality. Despite the increase in ethnic diversity of resettlement destinations, these areas did not experience a differential incidence of conflict for years until the nationwide rise in ethnic salience activated in-group identification and grievances.

Experts estimate that, by 2050, over 143 million will be internally displaced in developing countries due to climate change (Clement et al., 2021). This paper shows that the

²²Ethnic composition of initial settlers is available only at the province level in (CSA, 1991a).

demographic changes that accompany such large-scale population movements could affect conflict in the long-run when intergroup differences become salient. Migration destinations, particularly those where the newcomers are less integrated with the host communities and with socioeconomic disparities across groups, are vulnerable to conflicts due to the activation of latent divisions by ethnic actors.

State-led planned resettlements are also increasingly being considered to mitigate the effects of environmental adversities. [Gebresilasse \(2024\)](#) shows that the 1984-86 resettlement improved agricultural productivity in origin locations by easing population pressures on the environment and facilitating land consolidation. However, the results in this study show that resettlement schemes that create forced ethnic cohabitation and grievances may sow the seeds for future violence in the destination areas. Policymakers must weigh these long-run social costs alongside economic gains when designing migration and resettlement programs. Furthermore, resettlement schemes that respect the rights of settler and host communities and foster greater social integration in the destination districts could help to lessen the likelihood of ethnic conflicts in the long-run.

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
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A Online Appendix


A.1 Additional Figures

Figure A1: Drought Severity and Population Density in 1984

(a) Drought Severity (SPEI) in 1984




(b) Population Density in 1984




Source: Author's calculation using SPEI data from [Vicente-Serrano et al. \(2010\)](#) and district population data from the 1984 census [CSA and Commission \(1991\)](#)

Figure A2: Famine Incidence in 1984



Source: Author's calculation based on data from the [United Nations Development Program Emergency Unit for Ethiopia \(1999\)](#) database.

Figure A3: Population Resettled by Month and Origin Province



Source: Author's calculation based on data from [Sivini \(1986\)](#) compiled using reports from the RRC.

Figure A4: Ethnic Composition of Resettled Population By Destination Province




Figure A5: Correlation Between Fractionalization and Polarization (2007)





Figure A6: Resettlement and All Conflict Events

(a) Incidence

(b) Fatalities




Notes: The graphs plot the point values and 95% confidence intervals for the estimates on how in-resettlement intensity affects incidence and fatalities from all conflicts using the event study specification defined in equation 2.

Figure A7: Ethnic Diversity and Incidence of Conflicts Targeting Civilians

(a) Effect of Δ Fractionalization (1994-1984)

(b) Effect of Δ Polarization (1994-1984)




Notes: The graphs plot the point values and 95% confidence intervals for the estimates on how the changes in ethnic fractionalization and polarization indices from 1984 to 2007 affect incidence of conflicts targeting civilians.

Figure A8: Effects of Resettlement on Ethnic Identification


(a) Identify More Ethnic than National

(b) Identify Only Ethnic




Notes: The graphs plot the point values and 95% confidence intervals for the estimates on how in-resettlement and ethnic salience affects identification with ethnic vs national identity. 2.

Figure A9: Share of Resettlement Villages With Reported Causes of Initial Social Integration Problems




Notes: The figure presents the share of resettlement villages reporting social integration problems in 1988 by different causes. (CSA, 1991b).

Figure A10: Characteristics of Settlers by Resettlement Schemes




Notes: The figures show comparisons of the characteristics of the resettled population in conventional and integrated resettlement schemes based on reports on the census resettled population in 1988 (CSO, 1991).

Figure A11: Correlation Between Intensity of Integrated Resettlements and Short-Run Post-Resettlement Characteristics




Notes: The figures shows the estimates and 95% confidence intervals on the effect of share of integrated resettlements within the districts on different district-level post-resettlement characteristics based on reports on the census resettled population in 1988 (CSA, 1991b).

Figure A12: Effect of Any Resettlement on Internal Displacement



Notes: The graph plots the estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of indicator for any incidence of internal displacement originating in the district on an indicator for historical resettlement destination status using data from [International Organization for Migration \(2026\)](#) over 2017-2020.

Figure A13: Gelbach Decomposition of Resettlement Effects on Conflict



Notes: The figure reports a block Gelbach decomposition ([Gelbach, 2016](#)) of the effect of resettlement intensity on the frequency of conflicts targeting civilians, using the key mediators discussed in Section 6. Ethnic wealth stratification is measured as the awraja-level share of ethnic inequality attributable to between-group differences, separately for wealth and land, in 2011. Ethnic Composition and Sorting includes measures of ethnic fractionalization, polarization, segregation, exposure to non-dominant ethnicities, and isolation. Initial Social Integration Problems is measured as the awraja-level share of resettlements that reported initial integration difficulties due to violence, cultural differences, or land availability in 1988, separately.

A.2 Additional Tables

Table A1: Predictors of In-Resettlement

	Any In-Resettled (1)	Share In-Resettled (2)
Drought Severity (1984)	-0.339*** (0.017)	-1.373*** (0.517)
Pop Density (1984)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.006)
% Tree Cover (1984)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.056*** (0.020)
Distance to rivers	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.368 (0.234)
Border District	0.083 (0.102)	4.508*** (1.708)
Transhumant Pastoral Index	-0.033 (0.118)	-1.354** (0.656)
% Literate (1983)	0.004 (0.003)	0.016 (0.019)
Farmer Type: Crop Only (1983)	0.002 (0.002)	0.040 (0.033)
Ave Area Annual Crops (1983)	0.243** (0.110)	3.127 (2.067)
% Always Farm During Belg (1983)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.013 (0.013)
Baseline Cereal Productivity (1982)	0.185*** (0.052)	1.539 (1.056)
Ave Farm Income (1,000 Birr) (1983)	-0.101 (0.133)	-1.649 (2.117)
Distance to Service Cooperatives (1983)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.019 (0.061)
Distance to Big Market (1983)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.022 (0.017)
Distance to Addis	0.000 (0.000)	0.008 (0.009)
Distance to Provincial Capital	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.007 (0.012)
Fractionalization (1984)	0.089 (0.231)	3.949 (4.497)
Polarization (1984)	-0.149 (0.494)	-10.917 (14.408)
N	218	218

Notes: Conley standard errors that are spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A2: Resettlement and Ethnic Diversity

	Ethnic Diversity		Share of Population	
	Fractionalization	Polarization	Resettled Ethnicities	Amhara
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-Resett	0.047*** (0.005)	0.012*** (0.002)	4.547*** (0.695)	3.688*** (0.492)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1,066	1,066	1,066	1,066

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A3: Alternative Treatment Definitions

	Log Number of Civilian Targeting Events					
	All			By Ethnic Actors		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any In-Resett $\times$ Post-2015	0.101*** (0.033)			0.066*** (0.020)		
Log Pop In-Resett $\times$ Post-2015		0.016*** (0.004)			0.010*** (0.002)	
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Log Salience (Google)			0.045* (0.025)			0.035** (0.016)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	10,233	10,233	6,443	10,233	10,233	6,443

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A4: Robustness to Defining Outcomes on the Extensive Margin

	Any Incidence of Civilian Targetings			
	All		By Ethnic Actors	
	Events	Fatalities	Events	Fatalities
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.030*** (0.006)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.031*** (0.007)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	10,233	10,233	10,233	10,233

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A5: Robustness to Alternative Sample Restrictions

	Alternative Estimation Samples								
	Including Origins	Using All Districts inc. Tigray	All Districts Except Districts from Province				Welega	Exclude Districts On the Border	Only Destination Districts
			Illubabor	Kefa	Gonder	Gojam			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.058*** (0.019)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.032 (0.031)	0.063*** (0.021)	0.057*** (0.016)	0.054*** (0.019)	0.076** (0.030)	0.069*** (0.026)	0.060*** (0.017)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
N	12,069	12,555	11,664	11,502	12,042	11,637	11,205	9,504	2,268

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A6: Robustness to Alternative Specifications

	Alternative Specifications					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.079*** (0.012)	0.074*** (0.007)	0.065*** (0.019)	0.062*** (0.014)	0.044* (0.023)	0.043 (0.026)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$)			0.006 (0.006)			
Post-2015			0.215*** (0.022)			
District FEs	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓			✓	✓	✓
Awraja-Year FEs		✓				
Baseline Cont. X Post					✓	
Baseline Cont. X Lin. Trend				✓		✓
Baseline Cont. Additional X Post					✓	
Baseline Cont. Additional X Lin. Trend						✓
N	11,394	11,340	11,394	10,233	5,022	5,022

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A7: Robustness to Accounting for State Capacity and Mobile Access

	Log Number of Civilian Targeting Events			
	All		By Ethnic Actors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.019* (0.010)	0.068*** (0.014)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.057*** (0.015)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ State Capacity Index (Preceding Year)	-0.142*** (0.038)		-0.114*** (0.033)	
% Dist Pop With 2G Access		0.002 (0.002)		0.001*** (0.000)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Dist Pop With 2G Access		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.001** (0.000)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	10,233	5,685	10,233	5,685

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A8: Robustness To Controlling for Post-Resettlement Ethnicity Shares

	Log Number of Civilian Targetings			
	All		By Ethnic Actors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.071*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.015)	0.059*** (0.015)	0.046*** (0.012)
% Oromo (1994) $\times$ Post-2015	0.002** (0.001)		0.000 (0.001)	
% Tigrayan (1994) $\times$ Post-2015	0.000 (0.002)		0.000 (0.001)	
% Amhara (1994) $\times$ Post-2015	-0.001 (0.001)		-0.001* (0.000)	
% Oromo (2007) $\times$ Post-2015		0.001 (0.001)		0.000 (0.000)
% Tigrayan (2007) $\times$ Post-2015		0.000 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)
% Amhara (2007) $\times$ Post-2015		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.000)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	8,127	9,531	8,127	9,531

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A9: Robustness to Survey-Based Measures of Conflict and Safety

	Responses on Safety and Current Condition			
	Felt Unsafe (1)	Feared Crime (2)	Country's Condition Is Bad (3)	Ethnic Group Treated Unfairly (4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.047*** (0.009)	0.025* (0.014)	0.012 (0.020)	0.033*** (0.011)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	5,084	5,083	5,001	4,906

Notes: Conley standard errors that are spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A10: Heterogeneous Effects by Province-Level Ethnic Fractionalization of Initial Settlers

	Log Number of			
	All Conflicts		Civilian Targetings	
	Events (1)	Fatalities (2)	Events (3)	Fatalities (4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	-0.057 (0.065)	-0.079 (0.118)	-0.025 (0.044)	-0.058 (0.080)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015 $\times$ Provincial Settler Diversity	0.255* (0.136)	0.338 (0.212)	0.163* (0.098)	0.311** (0.148)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	4,482	4,482	4,482	4,482

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A11: Change in Ethnic Diversity (1984-2007) and Conflict Incidence

	Baseline Sample		Only In-Resettlement Districts	
	Log Number of Conflict Events			
	All Conflicts	Civilian Targetings	All Conflicts	Civilian Targetings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Fractionalization (2007-1984) $\times$ Post-2015	0.080 (0.151)	0.018 (0.073)	0.146 (0.347)	0.448* (0.234)
Δ Polarization (2007-1984) $\times$ Post-2015	2.364*** (0.833)	2.240*** (0.344)	0.034 (1.348)	0.289 (0.910)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	9,531	9,531	2,133	2,133

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A12: Change in Ethnic Diversity (1984-1994) and Conflict Incidence With Alternative Specifications

	Log Number of Conflict Events					
	All Conflicts			Civilian Targetings		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Fractionalization (1994-1984) $\times$ Post-2015	0.371* (0.194)		-0.245 (0.364)	0.566*** (0.154)		-0.070 (0.258)
Δ Polarization (1994-1984) $\times$ Post-2015		2.089*** (0.723)	2.779** (1.317)		2.672*** (0.540)	2.869*** (0.895)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1,620	1,620	1,620	1,620	1,620	1,620

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A13: Resettlement, Change In Diversity (1984-1994) and Conflict

	Log Number of Civilian Targeting Events			
	All		By Ethnic Actors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.061*** (0.017)	0.056*** (0.021)	0.052*** (0.015)	0.045*** (0.010)
Δ Fractionalization (1994-1984) $\times$ Post-2015	-0.025 (0.123)		0.008 (0.058)	
Δ Polarization (1994-1984) $\times$ Post-2015	1.920*** (0.360)		1.369*** (0.267)	
Δ Fractionalization (2007-1984) $\times$ Post-2015		-0.008 (0.073)		0.021 (0.041)
Δ Polarization (2007-1984) $\times$ Post-2015		2.096*** (0.346)		1.089*** (0.364)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	8,127	9,531	8,127	9,531

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A14: Resettlement, Protests, and Government Reactions

	Log Number of Events			
	Peaceful Protests	Protests with Interventions	Excessive Force Against Protesters	Violent Demonstrations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.009 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.003 (0.006)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	10,233	10,233	10,233	10,233

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A15: Resettlement and Ethnic Inequality In Wealth and Land

	Wealth Inequality (Theil Index)			Ethnic
	Total	Within Ethnicity	Between Ethnicities	Stratification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Wealth Inequality				
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.024* (0.012)	0.012** (0.005)	0.088*** (0.019)
N	347	347	347	347
Province FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Panel B: Land Inequality				
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$)	0.066* (0.034)	0.023 (0.024)	0.043*** (0.013)	0.041*** (0.009)
N	172	172	172	172
Province FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the awraja level in Panel A (given two waves of data) and province level in Panel B. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A16: Ethnic Stratification and Conflict In Destination Districts

	Log Number of Civilian Targetings			
	All		By Ethnic Actors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.029 (0.024)	0.020 (0.015)	0.025 (0.023)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015 $\times$ Ethnic Stratification (2011)	0.718*** (0.178)	0.668*** (0.242)	0.209** (0.104)	0.239* (0.131)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015 $\times$ Fractionalization (2011)		0.034 (0.073)		-0.020 (0.046)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Awraja-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2,106	2,106	2,106	2,106

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A17: Resettlement, Integration, and Ethnic Segregation and Exposure

	Ethnic Segregation (Dissimilarity)		Ethnic Isolation		Exposure to Non-Dominant Ethnicities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-Resett	0.023*** (0.004)	-0.016* (0.009)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.012** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.006)
Post-Resett $\times$ Share Integrated ($\div 100$)		-0.142*** (0.022)		-0.041*** (0.011)		-0.010 (0.013)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-Resett $\times$ Share Integrated ($\div 100$)		-0.038*** (0.014)		0.018* (0.009)		-0.005 (0.009)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	222	222	222	222	222	222

Notes: In column (1) ethnic segregation is measured using multigroup dissimilarity index to capture how unevenly ethnic groups are distributed across villages within a district. Isolation (column 2) and exposure to non-dominant ethnicities (column 3) measure the extent to which the average individual lives among co-ethnics or is exposed to locally non-dominant ethnic groups, respectively. Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A18: Reactivation of Conflict by Prevalence of Initial Social Integration Problems Within Awraja

	Log Number of Conflicts Targeting Civilians									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.153*** (0.036)	0.007 (0.017)	0.006 (0.014)	0.000 (0.016)	0.038*** (0.014)	0.034** (0.014)	0.015 (0.021)	0.053*** (0.019)	0.069** (0.032)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Social Problems Index $\times$ Post-2015	0.017 (0.017)									
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Violence $\times$ Post-2015		0.032*** (0.006)								
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Poverty $\times$ Post-2015			0.004 (0.004)							
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Culture $\times$ Post-2015				0.016* (0.009)						
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Religion $\times$ Post-2015					0.019* (0.011)					
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Climate/Health $\times$ Post-2015						-0.013*** (0.004)				
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Land $\times$ Post-2015							-0.015 (0.011)			
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Collective Work $\times$ Post-2015								0.002 (0.007)		
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Domestic Discord $\times$ Post-2015									-0.010* (0.006)	
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % Social Problems: Governance $\times$ Post-2015										-0.011 (0.007)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Awraja-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District X Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.

Table A19: Robustness To Controlling for Correlates of Prevalence of Integrated Settlers

	Log Number of Conflicts Targeting Civilians									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Post-2015	0.049** (0.022)	-0.209*** (0.032)	0.699*** (0.086)	0.089*** (0.032)	0.286*** (0.056)	0.109*** (0.027)	0.209*** (0.030)	-0.176*** (0.038)	-0.021 (0.028)	0.024 (0.063)
Share Integrated ($\div 100$) $\times$ Post-2015	-0.103** (0.048)	-0.128*** (0.047)	0.020 (0.052)	-0.149*** (0.050)	0.013 (0.066)	-0.109** (0.049)	-0.161*** (0.047)	-0.232*** (0.057)	-0.122** (0.053)	-0.067 (0.068)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Share Integrated ($\div 100$) $\times$ Post-2015	-0.199*** (0.032)	-0.232*** (0.032)	-0.290*** (0.037)	-0.147*** (0.029)	-0.258*** (0.037)	-0.219*** (0.029)	-0.114*** (0.027)	-0.167*** (0.035)	-0.137*** (0.032)	-0.182*** (0.048)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Provincial Settler Diversity $\times$ Post-2015		0.561*** (0.065)								
Log Pop In-Resett $\times$ Post-2015			0.101*** (0.027)							
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ Log Pop In-Resett $\times$ Post-2015			-0.072*** (0.007)							
% With Linguistic/Ethnic Differences (1988) $\times$ Post-2015				0.000 (0.001)						
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % With Linguistic/Ethnic Differences (1988) $\times$ Post-2015				-0.002** (0.001)						
% With Frequent Divorces (1988) $\times$ Post-2015					0.003*** (0.001)					
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % With Frequent Divorces (1988) $\times$ Post-2015					-0.004*** (0.001)					
% With Literacy Program (1988) $\times$ Post-2015						0.000 (0.000)				
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % With Literacy Program (1988) $\times$ Post-2015						-0.001** (0.000)				
% With Suitable Land for Agriculture (1988) $\times$ Post-2015							-0.002*** (0.001)			
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % With Suitable Land for Agriculture (1988) $\times$ Post-2015							-0.002*** (0.000)			
% With Slash-and-Burn Practice (1988) $\times$ Post-2015								-0.002*** (0.001)		
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % With Slash-and-Burn Practice (1988) $\times$ Post-2015								0.003*** (0.000)		
% With Markets $\times$ Post-2015									-0.001 (0.001)	
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % With Markets $\times$ Post-2015									0.002*** (0.001)	
% With Health Facility (1988) $\times$ Post-2015										0.001 (0.001)
Share In-Resett ($\div 10$) $\times$ % With Health Facility (1988) $\times$ Post-2015										0.000 (0.001)
District FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Drought Index (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop Density (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fractionalization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polarization (1984) $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border District $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2,268	2,268	2,268	2,268	2,268	2,268	2,268	2,268	2,268	2,268

Notes: Conley standard errors that are serially correlated at the district level and spatially correlated up to 500 km in parenthesis. Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.