Transcript of the talk, from the video's captions. Auto-generated: speaker names in particular are unreliable.
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# Weaponized Interdependence in World Politics (Fletcher keynote, 29 Oct 2019)

Authors: Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman (introduced by Daniel W. Drezner)  
Discussant: None  
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=146rA_nC578&t=0s


## Talk (00:00:00 – 00:34:50)

[00:00:00] my name is Daniel Dresner I want to thank you all very much before I start I want to thank most profusely the Russian your Ranger  
[00:00:13] program here at the Fletcher School particularly managed by our skorkowsky as well as the Carnegie Corporation which is a generous under a Ben Brooke and I also want to thank more about 2%  
[00:00:26] henry farrell in a new in some ways Marny Fenimore said to me right before I spoke in some ways here I'm the cover we're late which is to say that what I'm doing is sort of presenting he wears not that I have created but that others have  
[00:00:40] created say that you can argue in terms of studying economy there had been a lot of sort of you know debates that many of  
[00:00:51] us remember between sort of realist perspective Zahn independent and its liberal perspectives on and indeed the interdependence argument has been around since you know the days of the manual  
[00:01:05] account and Norman Angell with the idea that by and large perspective has been if this is only to the positive that is interdependence creates mutual dependency which means that actors will not engage in behavior that would  
[00:01:18] stabilize or lead to violence you can argue that that Henri names work which they are going to present I don't have too much um represents a direct challenge to that not in the same way I think that very often realists phrase  
[00:01:33] this point out that interdependence can green security rather the ways in which interdependence actually unintentionally to dramatically asymmetric in some ways empowers some actors at the expense of  
[00:01:48] others and then furthermore these forms of interdependence are often so great that escaping them or decoupling yourself from these systems is in fact far more complicated and far more costly  
[00:02:00] than you know previously understood and so with that the way we're going to approach the conference is first Henry neighbor going to present crux there which appeared in international security  
[00:02:15] summer then we will have another panel later on the sort of implications this international relations theory and then tomorrow we will have a series of panels highlighting the ways in which  
[00:02:28] weaponized interdependence of concept plays out in global finance in terms of online activity in terms of energy and transit and pipelines and infrastructure  
[00:02:40] and then another panel essentially on the forms of sort of resistance and reaction to this which is in some ways weaponized interdependence is called a lot of us by surprise even people that  
[00:02:52] you know are supposed to living and so the question is how can actors you know not just powerful with the first we need to understand the crux the argument and rather than me doing it is the  
[00:03:06] Tupperware lady let me introduce the [Applause] thank you so much down for this  
[00:03:20] wonderful introduction due to the Fletcher School for hosting us thank you to the Carnegie Corporation for funding and thank you to all of you for having come in many cases first beautiful distances here to participate in this  
[00:03:35] conference and I should say you know they've had Dan set some very very kind words about us we also know we have been drawing some conversation in these ideas draw upon conversations that we have had  
[00:03:48] over years over decades many people in this room Dan included and it's really really exciting for both of us to be at this global white paper is that how they're now able to feed back into the conversation to feed back into  
[00:04:01] conversations arguments other people can take these ideas can agree with them can disagree with them can bring them in directions that we didn't ever anticipate this is a this is a very very  
[00:04:13] exciting moment for I think so what I want to talk about we want to talk through briefly what the what the weaponized interdependence idea is and then it going to talk  
[00:04:26] where to where we want to go next what are the important issues at the world what is the agenda that this lays out as we see it and then hopefully we hope you hear what other people have to say in  
[00:04:38] response to that over the course we have a very straightforward argument even is that we have not paid enough attention in international economy in  
[00:04:53] international security to the road of economic networks if we think about globalization globalization is made out of networks paper like the dollar  
[00:05:07] clearing system need out of informational networks it's also made out of production networks that have led to these vast disaggregated supply chains which is made for manufacturing into a fundamentally see centralized  
[00:05:20] phenomenon which can happen across tens or dozens are even in some cases of 50 or 100 nations so that so that has been the big story of the last 20 years has been the creation of these networks and these networks in a certain says they  
[00:05:34] provide a kind of a a structure to the international coming this structure has consequences in particular has consequences for power and it have consequences for the ways in which states interact with each other it  
[00:05:47] allows States to exercise coercive capacities which are quite different in some significant Kohan and Joan I talked about in the 1970s 1980s they were interested in the ways in which  
[00:06:02] asymmetric interdependence between two countries could serve as a form of never aging and what we see here now is that when these networks can create they become essentials the functional economy by cutting people out by cutting States  
[00:06:16] out of these networks you can exercise some pretty extraordinary coercive force and so this is having all sorts of consequences which are beginning to our realize we have been frankly lucky for  
[00:06:29] certainly very very dubious values of luck enough when the piece came out because of course very things that are happening in the world many economic disruptions of you're seeing can be characterized can be  
[00:06:42] understood in terms of the broad phenom that we are talking about and in terms of related phenomena to which we are already beginning to think about how to not first of all as I say localization  
[00:06:55] is about the creation of world spanning networks these network that effectively tied together unites all of these different economies so we used to have national economies by coming together are that what common to be relative  
[00:07:09] discreet with oxy connections of trade and of Finance between them back in the 1970s 1980s but these economies were they were they were relatively independent and as globalization  
[00:07:22] precedes these markets and these economies become more and more interpenetrated and the way in which they become a new penetrated networks  
[00:07:35] bind the world together create a very very different kind of a community than we had before there are historical precedents for this obvious I don't think anything that is quite as intimately interconnected as what we see  
[00:07:49] today but nonetheless there's a fundamental transformation that happens 20 years in how the world economy works this has led obviously to a lot of commentary and to a lot of very very  
[00:08:03] enthusiastic allocation so there was a standard view of networks until about your scope which is networks are also networks are all about creating these  
[00:08:17] circumstances for an economic efficiency they're all about creating these wonderful new ways in which people can cooperate with each other and most importantly networks are flat they are seen as being a kind of a an alternative to traditional forms of power because  
[00:08:32] networks they look to be these these really decentralized things in which you see a see the grid of city streets and here if you're trying to get from point A to point B and there is a traffic  
[00:08:45] intersection look you can easily route around it so people think about networks these kind of ways they think about networks of effectively being like these flash homogeneous grids where it is possible to get from point A to point B  
[00:08:58] and which allowed for clever agile actors effectively to route their way around our asymmetries so this is a kind of argument that you see in a colorized  
[00:09:10] version at the workers class you see it in a more sophisticated version in the arguments of people like anne-marie slaughter the network's affect me that they thought they serve in a certain sense as a kind of an antidote to power  
[00:09:24] relations this is not true we know this if we look at how these networks actually work if we look at the form that these networks take we see that by and large they've never extended to be pretty fundamentally asymmetric that is  
[00:09:39] to say that some nodes in the network are much much much more important than others we have a cute little picture some of you will be familiar with I flew Delta this morning from Austin  
[00:09:54] and this is basically it's a map of one particular hub-and-spoke network that Delta Airlines uses in order to organize its flights and you will see that some points in this network are far far more important than others basically if you  
[00:10:08] want to get nearly anywhere in the world you got to fly through Atlanta first a cutesy example because it's an example  
[00:10:23] that actually is familiar whist but if you look at many of the networks that shape the world you'll actually see a pretty similar topography you will see that there are some nodes in the that are vastly more important than others  
[00:10:36] some those through which which are far more densely interconnected with rest network some notes that effectively serve as being these these juncture injunctions which then also have great consequences or how the rest of the  
[00:10:50] network operates at these nodes does these patterns emerge in a variety of ways sometimes as with Delta it's because it's a simple and economic way of trying to try to minimize costs sometimes it emerges because some  
[00:11:04] want to exercise the network they have an interest in making sure that they have control and sometimes it emerges in a very very decentralized way that's really rich get richer phenomena so that for example the internet looks pretty similar to this not because there's  
[00:11:19] something you do essentially designing it but just because if you're slightly more likely to connect to one node that another these natural advantages build up in a standard process which can be modeled mathematically so that you end  
[00:11:32] up with a grossly disparate number of yo some number of connections going to a very very small number of nodes that simple and straightforward argument that we make use of this describes and ways  
[00:11:46] in which it can happen the simple and straightforward argument we make is that this has consequences for power if you have networks not being these kind of these symmetric flap things which allow actress arrived around combinations  
[00:12:00] instantly turn out to be symmetric sooner or later this is going to become a way in which actors can exercise power including non economic actors such as States basic argument we lay it out in  
[00:12:13] great depth and bread answer is that this effectively allows some privileged states to use these hubs in order to  
[00:12:24] coerce other states so these hubs if you are a state which has some form of control over a hub for oursa so cadence in your geographic control perhaps you  
[00:12:38] have some other means of exercising our control over you are then able to use this in order to coerce other states beyond describe how this works through  
[00:12:51] pumping you know we describe two basic ways in this has importance these is a yours which is what we call the panopticon effect after Jeremy Benton's  
[00:13:05] famous a proposal for a prison in which it would be possible to see every cell from a single central point and if you have a control of a central hub as chill node in the network you can then  
[00:13:18] use this in order to see what everybody is saying to everybody else and this can provide some pretty profound strategic advantage so you can think about this in terms of how the NSA was capable of  
[00:13:31] using the asymmetric topology of the Navy Internet in order to in order to listen in a key junction point and to grab up vast amounts Bath's ways of communication which turn out to be  
[00:13:46] extraordinarily strategically valuable you can actually see similar phenomena having happen in the lead-up to World War one there is a fantastic book that describes how effectively the United  
[00:13:58] Kingdom try to exercise similar kinds of effects through its access to privileged information from insurance markets and from other markets in order to be able to get a step Germans and the other  
[00:14:12] effectively talk about is the jump point effect which is if you are a state which is capable of control if you're capable of controlling one of these few pumps you can effectively deny other states  
[00:14:25] access to the rest of the network and this can have devastating consequences example of this in the last number of years was Iran under the Obama administration where you saw effectively  
[00:14:39] the reason why I rattles willing to come to the table on the jcpoa was in large part because the United States had used together with European Union and used its control of the global financial system in order to effectively cut  
[00:14:53] around completely out on the one hand by using the Swift financial messaging system it's essential to international transactions by forbidding Iranian banks to have access to it on the other hand by using the dollar keyring system in order to scare the hell out of in fact  
[00:15:08] even think about doing business around and between these two this had massive and devastating consequences for the Iranian economy so that if you are able to use your control of the hub created  
[00:15:21] choke point you can really exercise some very very profound and important power which we think is something and Ava's going to I think arrest look at those lids everybody you know we  
[00:15:47] just want to emphasize that in the people we talk about the Internet in finances we're starting actually it's very focused on Europe that's because that's where we where you see this happening in the day to day papers is  
[00:16:00] really a lot in the Asian sphere so especially between the United States and China you think about the Huawei interactions but also it's not just to us and China there was recently an incident between Japan and South Korea  
[00:16:12] over key chemicals that are important to the flat screen industry you know these things you you have the weaponized interdependent lens on you start to see them everywhere loose all sanctions against Russia  
[00:16:25] there's just basically in our in our vision of the world this is becoming the first tool that the administration not just this administration the previous administration as well turns to when they're trying to think about how do they deal or grapple with a key  
[00:16:39] geostrategic so even though it's happening more and more you know there's also this question of like what happens when a major power like the United States uses this over and over and here's this is a quote from Jack Lew the  
[00:16:52] former Treasury secretary you know if we keep using these tools in this way is there some risk that we start to undermine this power this ability to use the infrastructure of these networks in  
[00:17:05] order to kind of achieve our geostrategic ends and here that's what I think we're hoping in the next 36 hours we can really get at these kinds of questions so what we want to kind of talk about is you said that we don't  
[00:17:19] really know yet or we're just starting to fumble through some of our ideas and I'm gonna lay out you know what I think Henry and I would say are our first best guests of what the next steps of this project are but we really are hoping that you know in the next 36 hours  
[00:17:33] wording here work you know what about this you guys anything about that and that's great because we we were hoping you know over the next several years to really build this out and hopefully you will so the first question is is this true this kind of this hub characteristic is  
[00:17:48] this always true in global economic networks and here as you move from your left to right you see you know in at least a network theory not all networks have this centralized characteristic some the more random graph networks they're much more decentralized now kind  
[00:18:02] of what we were talking about we're kind of in the middle or on your right side but really part of the question is empirically if you map the global economic networks how do they pan out and at least from kind of a very first look they have things like spot markets  
[00:18:17] for oil where you think okay that's really much more of the decentralized network that's not where states have the power in order to control these issues but what they do have the computer the place where they have to control is in the payment systems and so there's  
[00:18:31] another network that's layered over the other network where one is decentralized the other one isn't and so when you think about what is the policymakers question is to kind of identify where can they get leverage in the overlapping  
[00:18:44] character of the different constructions of the global economic structure so one of our kind of challenges is to really map out across a wide range of economic areas what is the just the training the topography of these gold economic  
[00:18:58] networks the second one is about activation a lot of what the paper is about is the structural condition is saying global economic networks look a certain way they create a certain structure or topography and the  
[00:19:11] questions when can states utilize that to their end in the paper we start to play with these first two issues the first is about just state capacity do you have the expertise to identify this is an issue and can you force it on your  
[00:19:26] adversaries and a lot of this is is both legal capacity you know you have the laws that let you do that so we walk through how 9/11 created a whole bunch of new legislative powers for the executive to use these kinds of tools but it's also about do you have the  
[00:19:40] knowledge to do this and one case that we've been looking at that's not in the paper is the ruse all sanctions where there's a part of the aluminum market that is very specific it's about how this high-end aluminum  
[00:19:54] that's used at the European production cycles their cars that the policymakers the in in Treasury they were not anticipating that that sanctioned would have such a consequence on this very specific part of the supply chain and then that led to kind of a lot of  
[00:20:08] frustration on both sides in Europe and States but what were the sanctions policy doing one of our takeaways is that if we're going to employ these types of tools we really have to have tremendous expertise in how economic  
[00:20:21] markets function just about what are the norms that allow you to use these tools and in some cases these are the norms about the target so is it legitimate to  
[00:20:34] use this tool to go after terrorists hey I think after 9/11 there was very little pushback about that if you think about Apple's decision after the San Bernardino attack to encrypt its technology and not give that over to the  
[00:20:47] state the norms about that target about using these kinds of tools for different types of targets have eroded and we would argue that that is gonna happen in other areas as well like with China you see right now the administration is ramping up what I would call an  
[00:21:01] ideological position saying that Chinese human rights their treatment of Weir's but that is something that we have to push back against and use these tools to do it well that the legitimacy of that globally is about is that a legitimate  
[00:21:15] target for these weapons to enforce Human Rights sanctions you could imagine a future administration using these tools for more environmental goals to say we have to confront global warming and we're gonna go after you with these  
[00:21:29] tools if you don't deal with that and so the legitimacy of that target we think is really important for the other is the legitimacy not just of the target but also of the the the actors involved so a lot of times the targets are the firms  
[00:21:43] they're the private sector actors they're the people that are being forced to comply with these rules and in our paper we look at in the internet space the United States did not use chokepoint tools they use much more the panopticon  
[00:21:56] tools and we argue that that is really about these days legitimacy questions that it was not legitimate for because of our kind of general consumption of how the internet works to people off from it and then there's a question between the future could that  
[00:22:11] change could we develop different norms kind of a more splintering of the Internet where people say you know that actually is quite legitimate points are just how which we you know just barely  
[00:22:24] touch on in the paper is that this type of power relies on network complying with these demands that a state like United States says you know what Google you're not allowed to sell your operating system to Huawei anymore  
[00:22:39] you're not allowed to provide updates to them and then the question is what does Google do they sit in this decision do they comply with that or not and one of the things I think we'd like to explore going forward is what space two firms have either to activate these tools we  
[00:22:54] have a very interesting example after 9/11 and that's basically said we're gonna step up we're gonna help fight terrorism we're gonna give information to the US government and for them it was a strategy that they you know the CEO  
[00:23:07] said he believed in it but you can also imagine it was a brand strategy to say that they are part of the American fight on terrorism but you can also see what Microsoft is doing today where they're saying we are not part of that coalition they're creating a set of norms called a  
[00:23:22] digital Geneva Convention where they're trying to argue that firms should not be placed in this position and we're going to see I think more and more global companies having to each decide whether they fall and what's their exposure in a  
[00:23:35] lot of cases their exposure is their compliance department that's who's enforcing them and making sure that they comply with these rules so do these compliance departments do they continue to hold sway the threat of some kind of you know that they'll get sanctioned or  
[00:23:49] do people do the leadership of a company say you know our brand image is more important than the risk of some kind of enforcement action this was this this section you might think of is like our scope conditions page you know like what  
[00:24:03] when can this weaponized interdependence happen and these are some of the ways that we're thinking through when it may or may not be able to be leveraged but we'd like to add to this the second thing that we really want to do pushing  
[00:24:16] forward is what we do in the conclusion of the paper is to think about is this namek model how does it change over time so what Henry presented was really the static view it was like if you have this structure what can you do  
[00:24:29] pepper we're here this is if you're in this position what are other people likely gonna do over time in response to that and here you know we're thinking about like a range of strategies that  
[00:24:42] could you know it could happen I'd like to start at the top which is when do hubs disappear this is really I think it's it's a huge question for Network theorists they don't have updated there's this idea that there's a  
[00:24:55] dependency there's another kind of set of ideas that well hubs are really there historically contingent and they can just go away it can kind of vanish overnight there's some kind of tipping point Green has a very troubling article that he brought about a year ago free  
[00:25:09] makes the argument that you know actually the pound it lost to the dollar in a very sudden set of moments it wasn't this path dependent that Kepler was going on for over time there was a bunch of contingent events and poof it's gone and so we don't have an answer to that but I think we need to study more  
[00:25:24] when can hubs disappear and when do they persist set of questions is what the target states do in response to this and some of the things are very standard in a kind of IR framework they bandwagon  
[00:25:37] and that's what Europe did in after 9/11 they said you know if the United States has the NSA let's use the NSA that will be helpful to us too and they did they took a huge advantage of that but what we're starting to see is other states are  
[00:25:51] doing other things like one set of states that we would argue are insulating themselves from from these these hubs creating their alternative set of these networks so if you think about China right after the September  
[00:26:05] 11th attacks after we started using these chokepoint attacks they created an alternative to Swift to that financial messaging system they created their own financial messaging system and of course it was just supposed to be cooperative and it's not any you know these kinds of  
[00:26:19] actions are just the first moving actions of potential targets to distance themselves from these networks Russia for example has been exploring using blockchain technology which is another way to get around these kinds of chokepoints in the financial  
[00:26:34] system another thing that we think is even more troubling is when actors decide that their best strategy is to infect the hubs of the primary state and so this is we would argue is what doing  
[00:26:48] in the internet space is don't just try to insulate yourself don't just bandwagon but destroy the you know the privileged state's ability to use those hubs as a coercive tool and if you just overpower the hub's with garbage and nonsense that  
[00:27:03] will no longer be effective in that kind of panopticon space so we're just starting to work those out but we would love to hear more of you know like there's got to be other ways that states are thinking about responding to them  
[00:27:15] the next kind of set of conversations is what are the alternatives for firms and I kind of already previewed this a little bit with Microsoft and their strategy of kind of setting up a set of competing norms about what is and is not  
[00:27:27] acceptable use of these networks point that we want to explore more is how networks are interacting with each other over time because you get this word network it makes you a little bit numb you just compares like a network really  
[00:27:42] there's mold there's a multiplicity of networks involved often they're interacting in very peculiar ways so it would just take those case of Huawei for a second while they started to build this new Internet infrastructure what we  
[00:27:55] call 5g and why is there such a crisis about Bhaiji it's because the United States is worried that they will Snowden us right that we Snowden them we weren't listening in to everything they did but if they build the next generation  
[00:28:10] Network then they will be able to do that to us so if you're trying to explain why is the United States freaking out about China and Huawei it's not because of trade tariffs or it's not about you know like because Huawei is such a big company it's because this  
[00:28:24] strategic asset could be taken over this hub by China who is a peer competitor if you look at how did the United States respond to this issue they responded by using a different set of networks they  
[00:28:38] said okay to prevent you from building this dominance in the information network we are going to use our supply chains to that company they put Huawei on this blacklist for component suppliers and as a result of  
[00:28:51] that Huawei can't build its technology so if it can't get access to Qualcomm chips u.s. semiconductors then it can't provide this infrastructure that is proposing and so what we're seeing is this interaction of different networks  
[00:29:04] where maybe you don't have a hub in some space United States doesn't have a 5g equipment maker in that sector but they can use this other area the supply chains that way in order to battle that  
[00:29:16] war the last kind of area that we think for research is a much more immediate set of questions so if you think about the first was this condition then we were thinking about more dynamics how to  
[00:29:31] networks that evolved over time this is more like the battlefields what happens in kind of a very kind of short timespan when you start to use these tools and Henry and I are you know the way we think about this is that right now we  
[00:29:45] are in like a 1945 moment where the players on the battlefield don't really understand the tools they're using they're stumbling through these things they've discovered and they're like new toys and aren't these toys fun and they do things that maybe it looks like  
[00:29:59] they're really powerful but there's also this chance that these things could spiral out of control and it's very unclear at least in the great power context of what are the rules of the road for using these types of tools and so here we're just thinking about okay  
[00:30:14] who has the capacity to escalate the conflict do you have the institutions on your side that could match the privileged States institutions so for example right now what you see is the United States is using a lot of these  
[00:30:28] tools in the network space and China is responding with whatever you call market power it's not actually using the network it doesn't have privileged hubs internet workspaces what it has is it has a very large market and so it's using very traditional do economic tools  
[00:30:42] to respond because it has the capacity over those things the second set of issues that we think are important are the issues of credibility one of these things likely to escalate and misunderstanding or miscalculation and we think here it's really important to give clear  
[00:30:56] signals of what are your intentions how credible is your correct and how can bar you to stand by it and here we would make the argument that you really should have a rules-based process to come to decide if you're going to use these tools so we've been  
[00:31:11] very I think worried when we see that the Trump administration has used these in a much more kind of exchange based relational you know like oh you want something on trade will then relax these  
[00:31:24] sanctions on huawei and that kind of once you put these tools into that vision that it's very hard for your partner you know the Chinese to understand how credible of a threat is this are you really gonna kill this company and ZTE your Huawei or whatever  
[00:31:39] it is or are you just gonna are you're just using this as kind of a ploy and when you do that then the kind of the escalation dynamics could get worse the final point is that we think that on the battlefield in a lot of this setting is  
[00:31:52] the network itself it's not about proxy states you know like Libya versus you know the kind of old world it's really the front line is Apple and Microsoft the companies themselves and so it's  
[00:32:06] very easy for a state to say I'm getting what I want because this other person is backing down but at what cost you know if you're destroying your domestic semiconductor you know like you  
[00:32:20] might have won the battle but did you really win so let me just have a few conclusions first is kind of what Henry started the conversation which is that  
[00:32:33] economic networks are not just about cooperation efficiency and win-win situations these economic networks create vulnerabilities and those vulnerabilities can can be used by  
[00:32:47] States as a sign of control we think that they're you know states are going to seek to protect themselves from these types of coercive tools but we are not envisioning a kind of world of decoupling we do not think that it's  
[00:33:01] very possible for large actors like the United States and China to just dissolve all of their relationships with each other it's more likely that we're going to see it's kind of like a divorce where you still have children hey you fight over those children you  
[00:33:16] fight over your relationship with each other but you also have to continue this conversation and the question is how you manage those conflicts and how do you minimize the threats that are involved rather than thinking about like what  
[00:33:29] really decouple would be which is like you breakfast we're seeing it as slow-motion train wreck it's happening no the question is can we really envision that for the third point is just about that there's a rebalancing of  
[00:33:43] security over efficiency and I think a lot of people are very uncomfortable with this you know that like security concerns it just goes back to the Alexander Hamilton do I have to say anything more it's like you know I was like there are places where security  
[00:33:56] does matter and we were deluded or we were we were sold a bill of goods that we didn't need to think about those issues anymore our argument is is that no Security's gonna play a role in economic decision-making and that's okay no need to freak out we don't need to  
[00:34:09] like throw everything over the baby out with the bathwater we just need to come up with a set of practices that will allow this world to persist and that's kind of our final point which is that you know Henry and I have been thinking in the paper at least  
[00:34:23] it's much more an academic argument Luke will say this and really say that and we want to have this really think to make this all bike you have to translate it and come up with a strategic toolbox for policymakers to say you know what what  
[00:34:38] should you be concerned with when can you use these tools when are you likely to get leverage out of them and we're hoping that in the next you know you're or so that we can start putting a little  
[00:34:48] work into that ever thanks we've got 20 minutes for questions before the next panel so I don't know if I one thing I want to  

## Q&A (00:34:50 – 00:58:03)

[00:35:17] identify yourself sorry Timothy Smith accidental Americans Association of the European Union one thing I've noticed maybe it's my own experience I do think you mentioned this kind of three  
[00:35:30] responses to these actions one of which is the amber agony effect one consequence ice I wonder how much impact is going to be the whole practice ed  
[00:35:43] process you mean the UK I always saw it as kind of the ultimate damn right us did something around the EU table the UK was always the country so let's join in I'd support the almost no matter what  
[00:35:57] the US did the fact that the UK is losing so much power and so much influence and it's just kind of circling the drain kind of is that making these  
[00:36:09] conflicts much more much is it generating much more conflict than the economic step is I imagine like a September 11th item we're almost certain  
[00:36:23] that among the EU nations the UK was saying you know we should support the US and you know now if you had that same type of event after Brax said you wouldn't have the UK in the room saying  
[00:36:36] that and you could have a much different response a much more defiant oh let's refuse to cooperate type of response to the US and I wonder how many I know the UK is relatively country I wonder how  
[00:36:50] much just that one event the impact is having yeah I mean in in this argument what we would focus on is when you have an economic hub what's the nearest  
[00:37:04] competitor that economic hub and for the United States for its financial system London is the near-term competitor and so brexit really strengthens the u.s.  
[00:37:16] position in the in kind of this you know it's like a gift to the Trump administration and on the flip side what you see is  
[00:37:30] there's been this recent effort by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to purchase the London Stock Exchange and in our vision of the world like that's a really bad thing for us power so you know that's just kind of how we wouldn't think about  
[00:37:41] brexit and how it's playing out with traffic so I think it's really I think the framework is really fascinating and  
[00:37:56] valuable and I think the fleshing out you guys are trying to do that was really encourage us to close on that it'll come up another time so one is the you know the slide you had a that had looking at the counter strategies of target states right I think as you say  
[00:38:09] it doesn't really get developed as much in the initial paper because that's really important to avoid having a an overly static conception of power right because the ability to impose costs economic loss doesn't necessarily bring  
[00:38:23] the achievement of your strategic objective I think the 'iron case is really interesting because among the strategies you have there the others are you know sort of you know not just counter networks but moving it over to another level another area of escalation  
[00:38:36] right in which risks go up and all sorts of other things I think that's going to be really important to have a conception of power that gets it the capacity to use that to which to achieve your objectives not just that not just  
[00:38:49] imposition of costs and same thing is that is and you stay there's a lot in the paper tape or is it the right domestic institutions you do it your is it it takes me back to the you know you know small state weak state work of pesticide and Kratzer and others at Dan  
[00:39:03] Jurgen spark and the role the national security has played in the strengthening of the American States even World War one and World War two you get these enormous powers economic regulatory powers over how many closed on a typewriter ribbon or  
[00:39:16] rationing of food and then it ratchets down and then the cold war doesn't ratchet down continuing your point about 9/11 and and and it's okay to have sufficiency and it's pretty interrelated what's the downside of that as well  
[00:39:30] right that can distort in some ways your your ability to compete right if you allocate resources and certain areas that are heavily security and they're not really you're competing with China will never build a certain  
[00:39:43] technologies ways it plays into other mouthing - card and civil liberties and others so I think that the the point you're making about you know the suit that you know sort of the unipolar moment in the 90s and there the message of 911 somebody  
[00:39:57] 9/11 is even more challenging at this balance right because it may well end up more open-ended that even though the Cold War was so the domestic institutions they seems they're useful to go back to that you know trucks a weak state and see what how valid some  
[00:40:10] of those arguments are now and what kind of updating the PA both theoretically in an applied fantastic and very helpful comments I would say with respect to the first two stops in key rights so there's a bit one interesting way in between  
[00:40:24] things that one part of this is looking at today around is very good case looking at the jcpoa what's happening at the moment we're effectively changed between jcpoa and what's happening right  
[00:40:38] one the first is that the europeans were on board coa they are not now and so here i think is when damage becomes a  
[00:40:48] piece if you if you are going to see it's going to happen  
[00:41:03] it was the same from the states which are peers with the united states but still also have some carbs so the key question here is the europeans are  
[00:41:12] beginning to gear up how it is they worry very much but what the united  
[00:41:26] states been doing unilaterally in order to try and push to to isolate europe from russia but if you have the  
[00:41:38] extensive sanctions so you see a whole bunch of people talking about how to build capacities in order  
[00:41:50] two years the same thing of course those different is that be your entertainment  
[00:42:01] this is much more standard sanctions 101 that you need here okay if you do this the sanctions either it's going to be  
[00:42:16] the nuclear program or else it's tourism or also just one together that we want to destroy your general but  
[00:42:31] they're purely are going to be some inefficiencies or also going to be various efforts my businesses too well  
[00:42:44] you may not like us or sure we get a lot better than our Chinese many other  
[00:42:59] companies are wanting to yes there are access to whatever holes of government money is going to be coming out of that and the other times you also see a much  
[00:43:12] more significant role hospital consequences possibly as well as negative with the whiskey kinds of you  
[00:43:26] know state kind of argument reasons benefits and there could be a second is  
[00:43:40] reversed effect as well you're going to see on bureaucracies using this as an excuse yeah much much more money much more sources and this is what is  
[00:43:50] happening here that the European Commission sees this as an opportunity to build up a very different model of legitimacy yep incubation wants to be all about  
[00:44:08] national champions and intersection and physically decreed a transformation I  
[00:44:25] just wanted to also add about the objectives that what the objective is also affects how states respond you see this in the China example right now it started it was much it was very much a compliance objective they'll break  
[00:44:40] reaching sanctions companies need to come and then it became a national security objective huawei can't be trusted to have this infrastructure because they'll listen in okay so then you have to create transparency rules about their technology most recently  
[00:44:54] it's an ideological demand which is you know the Chinese regime is bad and it's using this to promote authoritarianism that's much I think you know you can choose whatever objective you want but that the type of threat that it poses to  
[00:45:08] your target changes you know how X essentially is that thanks for that this is my more deep in a more from George Washington University thanks for this this is super exciting I  
[00:45:22] have a just a clarification question I'd like you to speak to briefly which is how much of this argument is about interdependence and how much is about plain old dependence there is fuzzyness  
[00:45:36] and slippage a number of these cases so for example with the Swift messaging system or with a lot of your chokepoint examples I'm not seeing the injury right  
[00:45:49] it's just dependence and sir because B is dependent on a days gonna put the squeeze on the end okay how much work is  
[00:46:00] the mutual dependence doing in this to make this a new kind of power argument isn't has the value added the new kind  
[00:46:14] of why should I buy your new top [Music] because it's not clear for example you  
[00:46:32] know around there's not so much interdependence okay well after you  
[00:46:45] respond if you go back to my there's a standard story there which is a story  
[00:47:04] about how the world is between mortgage in a variety of ways and they think about this as being a state just pick up a lot of great and interesting samples of how it is that the state's state B is able to possibly use this it  
[00:47:26] all sorts of important ways against more and more interconnections in structure  
[00:47:46] the structure is the network's works because you know once that substrate  
[00:48:03] thing sooner or later states if you want to say this is dependence rather than  
[00:48:19] introduce ain't no you know I think you can see that but it is dependent of edges dependence on a specific set of structures have emerged in order to make and there's consequences dependence just well  
[00:48:58] asymmetric the private four networks create these structures that then allows  
[00:49:41] you think you one of the first frame ACPO a course look at the second okay so the United States is squeezing the rod  
[00:49:55] and is trying to muscle other countries the stylize description of where we are in the Iranians are really the Iranians are really hurting because the Iranians  
[00:50:09] aren't back by xoring they are in fact in an asymmetrical dependence relationship they are victims of phenomena that you described in there so two points the Americans sit on the toe  
[00:50:24] points they have leverage the Iranians are basically that's one story second story which I think would be consistent with the worldís flat B yes but as we  
[00:50:38] can see the Americans have maxed out there the Iranians have adapted way they're adapting was by using the interdependent networks that exist in the world is flat  
[00:50:53] model you can always find someone to sell oil to there's all these cheaters out there who know how to work this interdependent world economy to move stuff around the Americans themselves  
[00:51:07] for reasons that we all understand but which are counterproductive have filled the world with hundred-dollar bills billions and billions and billions of dollars or in hands of people abroad or available to support all kinds of  
[00:51:22] commercial transactions outside of any of this digital system that we discuss if Iran basically takes a lickin and keeps on tickin is it a point against  
[00:51:36] your argument this is a point ironically in favor of the world is flat broke because if they're taking a look at and keep on second it's because they have discovered that the rule is a deep flat there's always a way around even in this particular case for the Americas are  
[00:51:49] very active and very strong this is kind of a crucial case that's my question  
[00:51:55] okay it depends on the attacking out the Iranians are able to take advantage if  
[00:52:20] instead we see something where the Iranians or others are able to attack the network or create a alternative network structure that is about evidence against our theory that is evidence that  
[00:52:34] we need to pay a little more effort and attention to the complications that I Eve described the interesting thing is but that's not the story we're seeing at the moment we're seeing a story around  
[00:52:48] purity is able to get the butt we also say there's a couple of days ago China doesn't see the try you know major  
[00:53:01] Chinese and I company enough that was basically stopping imports of Iran because the sanctions regime a good  
[00:53:15] example of yo China's China trying to cut nukes China can just say screw you and you have been in principle but  
[00:53:25] Chinese banks I think it's kind of a red herring important policy does the state  
[00:53:44] ever get its all of its objectives you know like I think cocaine said you know like there are there's power resources which are kind of what what power do you have as a state then do you actually get your objective well there's all these  
[00:53:56] intermediate things come in the middle to see if you actually get your objective I would say a lot of it is that it's not cool with us objective is and so it's very difficult to get people to follow this stuff when it's unclear what the objective is  
[00:54:11] but I think if you look at what has happened in terms of who's complying who's not it would follow our kind of networks story so basically all the European companies that have main actor  
[00:54:25] it's not a decentralized world where like voila is saving Iran you know the kind of anne-marie slaughter Friedman its China was up until recently still buying stuff and now they're not so you know it's like those kinds of things would follow this why is trying to able  
[00:54:40] to do that because they don't have a lot of deep pockets financial networks my question was if we look up office  
[00:54:53] election do you expect the next 11 12 most the Iranian and let's stand up and say you know you  
[00:55:07] win so badly we want to come back to the negotiating table renegotiation that's the objective of the outcome you put all the power of the United States behind  
[00:55:20] that objective must of our allies to do it you've been working on it for years well I'm asking it was when you have a question about your argument they fight upon the time Donald Trump leaves office  
[00:55:31] they have not succeeded I just have a different light I think I do not think that the Trump administration has a clear objective what like what is a renegotiated jcpoa I think it is very  
[00:55:46] clear the Iranian regime has suffered tremendously because of these tools now whether they capitulate that's another question and it's about what are they willing to suffer partly whether these  
[00:56:01] tools are as powerful relative to other tools which you the new argument are saying or actually rather I'm just pop positing this as a little social science  
[00:56:15] stuff you don't get many of them I'm asking you what would be a test period why wouldn't this be yeah I'm using advantage my network centrality because I'm gonna make two points and I mean  
[00:56:26] shifts in the first point is that part of the part of the loop I'm not as convinced that Iran is it good test of this in no small part because what I just said which is the u.s. negotiating position in terms of what's being asked  
[00:56:39] to so unclear it's not obvious that in Iran's perspective even if they would have made concessions that there would be any kind of quid pro quo in which the US would actually list these kinds of you know we lift what it's what it's  
[00:56:53] done and so part of the problem is that the the Trump position on this undercuts the leverage that it's actually generating and so I I do wonder if that makes that complicates the sort of test that you want this to be the second  
[00:57:07] point I would make and this is sort of more back towards the last panel we'll have tomorrow is it visit distance there's a difference between resistance in you can argue to some extent what's happening in Iran right now is undeniably persistent I'm gonna  
[00:57:21] consume the Dominions place but front ministration the extended be exists or so alarms that there simply it never occur to them to to concede because that would be in sort of existential surrender as far as but that's different  
[00:57:34] for saying that Iran is resilient and this you know where you know they you know there and there's a tendency I think I'm on scholars and for that matter of policy makers to confuse the two just because the country is not giving in doesn't it certainly mean they're  
[00:57:48] thriving in the face of this kind of economic pressure and so I think that's one of the other sort of ways to please thank Henry  
[00:58:00] [Music]